★★★ General Donn A. Starry made the following comments on the genesis of this March 1981 article and AirLand Battle: “The ultimate lesson of `Active Defense’ and the 1976 edition of FM [US Army Field Manual] 100-5 [Operations] is that it is virtually impossible to substantively rewrite doctrine satisfactorily in a matter of three years,... Continua a leggere →
★★★ Experiences from the Invasion Battles of Normandy A. Preliminary Remarks 1. Experiences fulfill their purposes only when they are quickly brought to the attention of the troops. This happens from time to time through the medium of individual teletype messages. 2. The following experiences summarize what has happened so far. It is left to the... Continua a leggere →
★★★ Questionnaire presented by US interrogators to Generalfeldmarschall (General Field Marshal) Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces), concerning German plans for counter attacking against the Allies after the Invasion of Normandy. Question: 1. What were the successive plans considered by the OKW: a) 6 Jun... Continua a leggere →
★★★ Questionnaire presented by US interrogators to Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, Alfred Jodl, concerning German plans for counter attacking against the Allies after the Invasion of Normandy. Invasion and Normandy Campaign 1. Question: What was Hitler’s personal influence on the construction and installation of the coastal defenses in the West? How far... Continua a leggere →
★★★ Interrogation of Generalleutnant [Lieutenant General] Rudolf Schmetzer concerning the construction of German defenses in Normandy, France. A) Fundamentals 1) Commands and organization of fortress engineers The sector corresponded exactly to the extent of command of the LXXXIV. Gen.Kdo [Generalkommando - Corps Headquarters], the coastal front of which reached from a point northeast of Caen to the border between... Continua a leggere →
★★★ No plan survives contact with the enemy. —Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke the Elder Sixty-four years after Moltke’s observation, two mid-level German commanders, faced with the herculean task of changing the course of history on an early June 1944 morning, failed in their duties. In using structured and qualitative analysis to examine German... Continua a leggere →
★★★ In April 1942, General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff, went to London with a set of plans to bring about the defeat of Germany in northwestern Europe. Operation Bolero detailed a rapid buildup of U.S. forces in England, and Operation Sledgehammer foresaw an emergency 1942 landing in France should the... Continua a leggere →
★★★★ A cross-channel attack to initiate the European Campaign remained the linchpin of American strategy for taking the war to Germany and defeating its armies in the field. This approach remained the centerpiece of Allied strategy despite the feared casualty rate from a dedicated German resistance, and the fact that the nei-ther the British allies... Continua a leggere →
★★★ Let’s hit a reset, please. Attrition is perhaps one of the most misunderstood and abused ideas in contemporary military thinking. Policymakers, military practitioners, and theorists often use and abuse a slew of pejoratives to undercut attrition.1 This phenomenon is a byproduct of 1980s and 1990s writing, which advocated non attritionalist forms of warfare that appeared... Continua a leggere →
★★★ Warfare exists in the realm of both art and science – as a phenomenon in which sensing and intuition (in other words, art) play a complementary role to education and training (science). Just as a painter must have more than one color on his pallet, the practitioner of warfare must understand more than one... Continua a leggere →
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