★★★ General Donn A. Starry made the following comments on the genesis of this March 1981 article and AirLand Battle: “The ultimate lesson of `Active Defense’ and the 1976 edition of FM [US Army Field Manual] 100-5 [Operations] is that it is virtually impossible to substantively rewrite doctrine satisfactorily in a matter of three years,... Continua a leggere →
★★ Part 1: England: "Hurry up and proceed with caution!" In 1918, the British Empire was the world leader in both the development of armored equipment and tactics. The attitude prevalent at the time in most armies was still that the tank was a specialized infantry-support weapon useful in crossing entrenchments but not much else.... Continua a leggere →
★★★ The Modern Breakthrough In the modern era of the novel Coronavirus plague, a revolutionary concept of the Breakthrough on the battlefield should be contemplated when considering engaging in the friction of war on all fronts. This modernized form of the Breakthrough should be understood and considered within the realm of the objective perspective... Continua a leggere →
★★★ The core of the Italian armed forces is the ground forces, the development of which is in accordance with the requirements of the command of the aggressive NATO bloc. Italian experts consider the armored forces to be the main striking force of the ground forces. They are intended to solve the most important tasks... Continua a leggere →
★★★ The Pentagon's military preparations devote a significant place to the development of armored and mechanized forces. Thus, of the 13 divisions currently in the regular army's combat strength, three are armored and four are mechanized. A mechanized division is considered the main combined arms unit, comprising units and subdivisions of various branches of the... Continua a leggere →
★★★★ WHY THE JAPANESE WERE SUCCESSFUL The army we put in the field was unable to defeat the Japanese in the time allotted to it. Many historians will probably essay to solve the riddle of how a Power, which we regarded as belonging to the second class, and one which not long ago possessed no... Continua a leggere →
★★★★ REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES Against this part of the memorandum I wrote the words, “It would be better to do it simultaneously.” On my way to the front I received a telegram from General Sakharoff, dated March 21, in which he said that my request for the troops guarding the line to Harbin to be... Continua a leggere →
★★★★ REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES The minor part played by the fleet—The small carrying capacity of the Siberian and Eastern Chinese Railways—Absence of any diplomatic arrangements to permit of the unhampered dispatch and distribution of our forces—Delay in mobilization of reinforcements—Disadvantages of “partial mobilization”—Transfer during the war of regulars from military districts in European Russia... Continua a leggere →
★★★ Let’s hit a reset, please. Attrition is perhaps one of the most misunderstood and abused ideas in contemporary military thinking. Policymakers, military practitioners, and theorists often use and abuse a slew of pejoratives to undercut attrition.1 This phenomenon is a byproduct of 1980s and 1990s writing, which advocated non attritionalist forms of warfare that appeared... Continua a leggere →
★★★ Warfare exists in the realm of both art and science – as a phenomenon in which sensing and intuition (in other words, art) play a complementary role to education and training (science). Just as a painter must have more than one color on his pallet, the practitioner of warfare must understand more than one... Continua a leggere →
militartis.com 