Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare: Theory and Practice (II)

Guerrilla units operating in cities must solve strictly defined tasks, limited in scale, being, in fact, reconnaissance and sabotage groups. This is due to the fact that, according to their conditions (high population density, dense transport network, active police and counterintelligence activities, etc.), cities, as well as suburban areas, are the most unfavorable terrain for waging guerrilla warfare.

The main tasks performed by such units are as follows: destruction of government officials, military personnel, police officers, and propagandists of the ruling regime; expropriation; sabotage and diversion; protection of civil disobedience; reconnaissance.

In the practice of urban insurgents, there are two main options for organizing urban guerrilla units. In the first case, all fighters are in an illegal position; in the second, the guerrillas lead a normal way of life, changing it only when carrying out operations.

Both options have their advantages and disadvantages. Thus, when constantly in an illegal position, partisans are forced to use false documents, which greatly increases the risk of failure. When in a semi-legal position, the intensity of military actions is sharply reduced. Therefore, in practice, urban partisan detachments usually consist of both illegals and people leading a double life. To reduce the likelihood of failure, partisans operating in cities must strictly adhere to the rules of conspiracy, outwardly not standing out from the general population. In the event of a danger of exposure, partisans leave the city and go to areas controlled by the partisan army.

The weapons of urban guerrillas are often different from those used by guerrillas in other areas. Here, the main requirement is the ability to carry them concealed and hide in hiding places. Therefore, urban guerrillas should be armed mainly with pistols and small-sized automatic weapons (submachine guns), hand grenades, incendiary devices and explosives. In some cases, the use of sawed-off shotguns and cold arms is effective.

When carrying out terrorist acts, sabotage and diversions, urban rebels strive to carry them out on a mass scale, since only a massive attack can paralyze the work of government agencies, banks, the media, law enforcement agencies and special services and bring the necessary military and propaganda effect.

Carlos Marighella, in his book “Urban Guerrilla”, speaking about the qualities of an urban guerrilla, wrote: “The urban guerrilla must be brave and decisive, he must be a good strategist. The necessary skills include the ability to shoot well. Cunning and caution are necessary – these qualities compensate for the lack of weapons, ammunition and equipment. The army and police, which serve the government, have modern weapons, modern vehicles and means of mobile delivery of personnel. They have at their disposal all the capabilities of the regime in power. The urban guerrilla does not have such capabilities – he acts underground.

The qualities of an urban guerrilla are initiative, quick reaction, flexibility, the ability to use various means at his disposal, and presence of mind. Above all, one must develop the ability to take initiative. It is clear that it is impossible to foresee all possible developments in a situation, but it is still unacceptable for an urban guerrilla not to know what he should do because he “has not received the appropriate orders.” In any case, his duty is to act and find the appropriate solution for each emerging problem himself, without trying to escape from it. Action, even if accompanied by mistakes, is always better than inaction caused by the desire to avoid mistakes. Without initiative, urban guerrilla warfare is impossible. In addition, an urban guerrilla needs good physical training. He must be able to endure fatigue, hunger, rain and heat, he must be able to stand guard. The ability to hide, use camouflage, hide, change clothes and, at the same time, the ability not to be afraid of danger, looking it in the face, are necessary. The urban guerrilla must be able to operate regardless of the time of day or night, without the special strain caused by this circumstance. It is necessary to have boundless patience, always remain calm and control your nerves even under extremely unfavorable circumstances and in hopeless situations. Great care must be taken not to leave behind evidence or traces that would enable the enemy to detect him. But above all, the urban guerrilla must never despair. Often, comrades who have encountered difficulties that seem insurmountable to them leave the ranks of the urban guerrillas.

Of course, urban guerrilla activity is not contract work. It is different from ordinary work obligations and from a theatrical performance. It must be remembered that participation in urban guerrilla warfare, as indeed in any guerrilla war, regardless of location, is an obligation that each person undertakes for himself. If he is not able to cope with difficulties, if he does not have the necessary patience and the ability to wait – without nervous breakdowns and without attacks of despair, then it is better (for himself) for him to refrain from taking on such an obligation. The same applies to people who obviously lack the most basic skills necessary for a participant in urban guerrilla warfare.”

The importance of intelligence should never be underestimated, intelligence precedes every step of the partisan. Partisans can defeat a regular army only if they manage to seize and maintain the initiative, and this is only possible when the partisans have the most complete and accurate information about the enemy.

“Reconnaissance also predetermines the course of action of the partisans; the latter can rarely create the most advantageous starting position by open force and only use moments in the situation, guided by intelligence data. The secrecy of reconnaissance is also of great importance; the latter is so diverse in its forms and methods that it does not always even fit the concept of contact with the enemy” (P. Karatygin).

In guerrilla warfare, reconnaissance is one of the most important types of combat activity. Reconnaissance is the activities of the guerrilla leadership, their headquarters, and the actions of the fighters themselves, conducted to obtain information about an active or potential enemy, the composition of his forces, location, characteristics of actions and intentions, as well as about the terrain in the base area, on the routes of movement and in the areas of combat missions.

In essence, reconnaissance is a type of operational support for partisans. Reconnaissance forces and means include reconnaissance units, regular units allocated from the partisan detachment, and agents. Reconnaissance methods include observation and surveillance of the enemy, photography, eavesdropping, raids, ambushes, reconnaissance in force, obtaining information from local residents, interrogating prisoners and defectors, studying captured documents; radio interception and direction finding may also be used.

Tactical reconnaissance is the action of reconnaissance units allocated for this purpose by a partisan detachment. A small partisan group allocates observers and reconnaissance patrols (2-3 people); a partisan detachment sends individual observers, observation posts and patrols (5-6 people) or reconnaissance groups (10-12 people) for this purpose.

Operational reconnaissance refers to the actions of special purpose reconnaissance groups and agents. Such groups are sent from a detachment to distances of up to 100 km or more with the task of conducting reconnaissance of distant enemy targets and putting them out of action by sabotage. The group usually includes a specialist in military reconnaissance, one or two operatives in agent work, and two or three saboteurs.

In turn, strategic intelligence implies exclusively agent work (although the use of agents is, of course, not excluded at both the tactical and operational levels). This work is carried out by agents trained in advance or recruited during intelligence operations. It should be noted that it is agent intelligence that allows partisans to penetrate the enemy’s punitive organs, special services, and administrative institutions.

Considering the exceptional importance of intelligence, its management is carried out either by the commander of the partisan formation himself or by his deputy for intelligence (or counterintelligence).

Agent reconnaissance for tactical purposes is conducted in populated areas and on traffic routes. The main targets are enemy military and economic facilities, punitive bodies and local administration.

On an operational scale, intelligence is mainly carried out by large partisan formations. The tasks here are as follows: obtaining information about the composition, armament and specifics of the actions of regular units and punitive forces of the enemy in the main operational directions, about the movement of various enemy units, cargo and manpower by different types of transport, about the camouflage measures of the enemy.

At the strategic level, intelligence must establish the composition and nature of the actions of enemy forces in a strategically important area of ​​the theater of military operations, the location of the most important military facilities, command posts, supply bases and defensive lines.

A vitally important type of partisan activity is counterintelligence. Counterintelligence is a set of measures to combat enemy agents and their military intelligence. In general, counterintelligence activities include establishing a regime in the base area and on the routes of movement of the partisan formation, protection and defense of the objects of vital activity of the partisans, and in addition, camouflage, disinformation, the fight against false partisan units, conspiracy and counterintelligence itself.

The regime on the routes of movement and in the base area is established by the commander of the partisan detachment and provides for the establishment of the order of life of the local population in the partisan zones; the issuance of special certificates and the installation of passwords for mutual identification of partisans; a ban on the movement of the local population and the partisans themselves in certain zones; regular checks of documents and passes; restrictions on the operation of communications and transport; the introduction of a curfew; the establishment of strict control over the production, storage and conservation of weapons, ammunition and explosives; the protection of agricultural plots of local residents helping the partisans; control over the distribution and expenditure of funds.

The protection and defense of partisan objects includes all possible measures for the troop and operational cover of vital objects. In this case, the basing areas and movement routes must be covered especially carefully. The protection and defense of objects is usually organized along three lines: at distant approaches to objects (from ten to fifteen kilometers), at close approaches (from three to four kilometers) and directly at vital centers. For this purpose, the partisan formation posts guards, secrets, patrols, patrols and sentries.

Camouflage is one of the effective ways to mislead the enemy, since it allows hiding a partisan object from all types of enemy observation, changing the appearance of the object, removing unmasking signs, creating interference for technical means and reconnaissance of the enemy and thus ensuring the survivability of the partisan formation. Camouflage must be observed not only on the scale of the partisan detachment, but also by each fighter individually.

Disinformation means the active covert promotion of specially prepared information with the aim of misleading the enemy and inducing him to the desired decisions and actions. This may be a complete distortion of information about some object, a partial distortion of information, or it may be the preparation of completely reliable information, which, however, will be perceived by the enemy as false.

Secrecy involves keeping any information about the partisans’ activities secret from the enemy’s special services and from individuals. Secrecy must be strictly observed at all levels – from verbal orders and the preparation of staff documentation to the actions of individual units.

Counterintelligence itself includes a set of measures to combat espionage, prevent treason, combat extremist elements that discredit the partisan movement, check individuals recruited into a partisan detachment, ensure the security of the partisan leadership, participate in disinformation of the enemy, and also carry out special assignments from the leadership.

Most often, in partisan formations, counterintelligence work is carried out by intelligence units or individual members of them, since in enemy territory, intelligence and counterintelligence tasks are often interconnected.

The main suppliers of information are residents, agents and trusted persons who report to the deputy commander for intelligence or the counterintelligence section of the partisan headquarters.

An IMPORTANT component of partisan warfare is its moral and psychological support. This is a system of measures aimed at forming and maintaining high morale, observing discipline and the established law and order, uniting the fighting collective of the partisan detachment, as well as implementing information and psychological influence on the enemy. In this case, all available means are used – the press, television, radio, the Internet.

The goals of moral and psychological training of partisans are: to establish in the minds of fighters such moral values ​​as patriotism, a sense of duty, discipline, honesty, etc.; to develop the moral and volitional qualities necessary for participation in partisan warfare, ensuring the psychological stability of fighters in any situation (resilience, self-control, dedication); to develop norms and rules of relationships within the formation, without which the existence and combat activity of a combat team is impossible (camaraderie, mutual assistance, respectful attitude towards commanders and subordinates).

Moral and psychological training is an independent task of training and education of partisans. It is carried out in the process of everyday and combat activities, as well as during such special events as protecting fighters from enemy psychological operations, conducting individual selection of fighters, testing new partisans in the performance of individual combat missions. The main methodological guidance and direct implementation of such events are carried out by unit commanders and specially appointed persons.

The classic and textbook example of an almost ideal “ideological leader” of the partisans is S. V. Rudnev, the commissar of the partisan unit of S. A. Kovpak. He was not only a truly honest and uncompromising person; he had personal charm, knew how to lead people and, in addition, being a professional military man, had basic theoretical partisan training received in special courses. In the unit, Commissar Rudnev enjoyed unquestioned authority and respect. His death during the Carpathian raid was a real tragedy for all the partisans of the unit.

FINALLY, we must also mention the rear support of the partisans. It includes material, transport, medical, domestic and financial support.

Material support is understood as the entire complex of measures aimed at satisfying the partisans’ needs for material resources. Material resources are weapons and combat equipment, ammunition and mines and explosives, food and medicine, which are necessary for the life and combat activities of a partisan detachment. Sources for replenishing these material resources are trophies captured from the enemy, products of our own production, assistance from the local population, collection in places of past battles, acquisition through the enemy’s trade network and, finally, supplies from the mainland (if any).

The capture of trophies by partisans is traditionally carried out by raids on enemy warehouses, supply bases, small garrisons, administrative institutions and other enemy objects. In addition, ambushes and sabotage on communication routes can be carried out for the same purpose.

Own production of material resources usually takes place in conditions of a developed partisan movement, when partisan forces control a significant territory and have their own partisan zones. First of all, the partisan leadership strives to establish the production of hand grenades, mines, explosives, mortars, grenade launchers, and in some cases, individual types of small arms.

Help from the local population is the most common and accessible way to provide partisans with food, clothing, footwear, medicine, and money. Basically, partisan formations can count on help in the form of food, especially in the initial period of their combat activities. At the same time, partisans should not abuse the help of local residents and are obliged to pay for food and other goods or, at least, issue receipts.

Finally, medical support for partisans should include medical and preventive, medical and evacuation, sanitary and anti-epidemic measures. This also includes measures to protect against weapons of mass destruction.

It is quite natural that long-term presence in field conditions has an adverse effect on the health of fighters. In addition, poor provision of clothing, footwear, difficulties in treating the sick and wounded, a shortage of medicines and qualified medical workers are also a common, routine phenomenon for partisan life.

Regarding the importance of medicine in guerrilla life, we can refer to the authoritative opinion of Che Guevara (let us recall that he played the role of a doctor in Fidel Castro’s detachment) that “the role of a doctor in a guerrilla detachment is great. During a guerrilla war, a doctor provides fighters not only with comprehensive medical care. If necessary, he fights to save their lives. And if the means at his disposal are insufficient, he morally supports the patient with his presence, trying to alleviate his suffering as much as possible. He does not leave the wounded until he is healthy.

The organization of work in hospitals is determined by the level of development of partisan detachments. Depending on this, three main types of hospital organization are distinguished. … The doctor, if there is one, participates in the life of the detachment on an equal basis with his comrades. In fact, this is another fighter, often performing the same tasks as the partisan. Like all partisans, he goes on the attack. Along with this, he performs the difficult and sometimes completely hopeless task of saving the life of a wounded fighter in the absence of the necessary conditions. At this stage, the doctor occupies far from the last place in the partisan army.

I would like to note the moral significance of the presence of a doctor in a partisan unit. The fighters often see him as a true holy father, bringing them comfort. For a person who is suffering, a simple aspirin tablet, given by the hand of a friend who understands and shares his suffering, has a great impact.”

* * *

The RUSSIAN government, continuing the traditions of the Soviet government, completely ignores the changed nature of modern warfare and therefore rejects all proposals to create Russian special forces, although proposals in this area have been made repeatedly. In particular, V. Kvachkov, one of the best modern theorists and practitioners of guerrilla warfare in Russia, the author of a small but very capacious monograph “Special Forces of Russia”, has come forward with his proposals several times. There has been no reaction from the government, which is not surprising.

In order to assess how far the Russian army has fallen behind Western armies, and above all the United States army, let’s see how things are going with their preparations for a “small war.”

It should be noted that the very concept of “guerrilla warfare” fits completely into the definition of “special operation”. From the point of view of most modern Western military experts, special operations are operations conducted by specially created, trained and equipped military and paramilitary formations to achieve military, political, economic or informational goals through the use of so-called “unconventional” military means on enemy territory, in forbidden, inaccessible for penetration or in politically unstable areas. Unconventional actions include interrelated forms and methods of guerrilla warfare, leaving the territory under enemy control and organizing escapes from captivity, subversive activities and sabotage, as well as other low-profile operations, hidden or secret in nature. All interrelated types of unconventional actions can be carried out both by individuals and collectively in all conditions of peacetime and wartime. These operations are conducted across the entire spectrum of operations by armed forces independently or in cooperation with conventional, non-special forces.

The developing military-political situation determines how to conduct special operations, based on the need to use hidden or secret forms and methods, the need for constant control over their progress by the military-political leadership. Special operations differ from conventional operations of the armed forces in the degree of physical and political risks, forms and methods of conducting autonomous actions, dependence on detailed intelligence and local conditions and capabilities.

Special operations have become an integral part of theater campaigns across the entire spectrum of military operations. While some special operations may be conducted independently in a particular theater or in support of national priorities, most special operations are designed and conducted to advance the likelihood of success in a theater campaign. Special operations typically complement the actions of the military.

Successful conduct of special operations is based on the personal skill of military personnel and the professional training of units using a variety of special, unconventional combat techniques characterized by adaptation to the conditions of the situation, as well as improvisation, novelty and the ability to rely on one’s own strength.

The small number, specific training and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) of combat units of special operations forces make it possible to respond appropriately to emerging threats and challenges. At the same time, such a measured use of military force does not entail an increase in the degree of political responsibility for these actions or the possibility of escalation of the conflict, which is accompanied, in accordance with established practice, by the use of significantly larger conventional forces, the use of which cannot be hidden.

Special operations can be conducted with the aim of direct combat with the enemy, such as during a raid to destroy military communication hubs. They can also have an indirect impact on the opposing side by organizing, training and providing local formations of a neighboring state through strengthening its defense capability, and by means of psychological operations – to obtain the necessary ideological support from local military-political circles and the population. In any case, the achieved results are incomparable with the small number of units and subdivisions involved.

A distinctive feature of modern special operations is their joint nature. Although they can be conducted within the framework of one branch of the armed forces, they usually require the unification and interaction of the branches and types of troops.

Although special operations are conducted across the entire spectrum of armed forces activities, the goals and objectives of special operations can be concentrated at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, depending on the evolving military-political situation in the theater of military operations.

The military-political leadership of the country defines the tasks for achieving the goals of the national strategy and authorizes the use of the necessary military force to implement them, including special operations forces, whose actions in these cases are controlled at the highest level.

As a rule, special operations are aimed at solving strategic and operational tasks, but they can be carried out to support the actions of conventional forces at the tactical level.

Special operations have a number of characteristic features that, taken together, distinguish them from conventional actions. Special operations may be planned and conducted with the aim of influencing the leadership of a country in order to create conditions favorable to the strategic goals and objectives of the United States. At the same time, they are primarily offensive in nature with a high degree of physical and political risks and are conducted for very high goals, often limited by time frames. These operations are based on surprise, the safety of their personnel, determination, and misleading the enemy. In addition, the effectiveness of special operations is achieved by the covert nature of their conduct. Therefore, due to the above factors, success in these operations is achieved only on the first try.

Special operations require careful operational planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the cultural and linguistic characteristics of the area of ​​upcoming operations. Rigorous combat training and rehearsal of upcoming actions are an integral part of the successful conduct of special operations.

Special operations are often conducted at great distances from the operational bases. They are characterized by the use of modern communications systems and means of airlifting dedicated forces to their destinations, support, and evacuation assets to enter and return from enemy-held, heavily guarded, or politically unstable territory. Special operations require a specific and targeted application of military force, which necessitates the development, procurement, and use of special weapons and equipment whose standards differ from those of the generally accepted Department of Defense.

Historical experience, when individual units successfully solved tasks of strategic or operational significance, confirmed the need to create units and subdivisions that combine specially trained personnel, special weapons and equipment, and special tactics of action that have no analogues in conventional troops. This allows the use of unconventional methods of confrontation, to repel which the enemy is most often not prepared.

Conventional forces are not specially trained, organized, or equipped for special operations. Any significant change in their mission would inevitably affect their ability to respond effectively to a wide range of threats. The need and ability to strike strategic and combat targets with small numbers of personnel has led to the creation of special units with specific, highly focused capabilities.

Forces specifically assigned to conduct special operations include the special operations forces of the ground forces, consisting of a regular (in American terminology – active) component, the National Guard and the reserve component, including special forces, ranger units and subunits, army special forces aviation, psychological operations units, and civil administration liaison; special operations forces of the navy (active and reserve components), consisting of special forces groups, including reconnaissance and sabotage detachments, special transport detachments, special purpose boat squadrons, and coastal patrol boats; special operations forces of the navy (active and reserve components), including special operations units and subunits, special operations groups, psychological operations units, and units to assist in strengthening the internal defense of foreign states.

Special Operations Forces are best suited to conduct the vast majority of special operations. However, in some cases, conventional forces may be called upon to conduct a special operation. Not inherently trained for such operations, they must undergo intensive training and receive the necessary equipment to support or conduct a special operation to perform a specific task. They may include dedicated surface, underwater, and air forces and assets of the Navy, units and subunits of the Marine Corps deployed on ships, as well as forward-deployed air-land tactical groups, such as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, originally adapted to conduct special operations.

In analyzing the role and significance of special operations, it was concluded that, despite their ever-growing importance, wars are not won by them; special operations can only reinforce and supplement the actions of conventional forces. Despite their ability to conduct independent actions and solve problems of disabling or destroying key enemy targets, they cannot be considered in isolation from the actions of conventional forces. As a conflict escalates into combat, the line between conventional special operations and, for example, military reconnaissance becomes difficult to distinguish.

It should be noted that all of the listed forms of special actions (or some of them) can be carried out both simultaneously and sequentially, as well as isolated from each other in time and place. In most cases, special actions are implemented in a complex and mutually complement each other. Moreover, special formations of various purposes can participate in them. At the same time, each of the components of the special formations can be involved in solving the problems of various forms of combat operations. But their main goal, according to Western experts, is “to ensure strategic surprise, high efficiency of reconnaissance, sabotage and subversive action, broad maneuver along the front and in depth with the solution of individual problems with the help of agents, rebels and partisans.”

However, it is quite obvious that each of these forms of special operations has its own characteristics and distinctive features, and each component of the special forces usually performs the most typical tasks for it. The special forces units of the ground forces of Western countries are undoubtedly the most universal in their use of special forces structures.

The field regulations of leading states formulate their tasks in both strategic and operational-tactical operations.

The main tasks of special forces units in strategic operations are: actions against the insurgency; waging guerrilla warfare (organizing and carrying out acts of sabotage, diversion, disabling particularly important facilities, killing and kidnapping political and military figures); organizing the escape of their own servicemen from captivity, freeing hostages, removing particularly valuable property; disrupting the work of the rear and communications of the enemy armed forces; conducting reconnaissance in the interests of the strategic command.

Special operations in the interests of supporting the actions of military formations and units at the tactical level are planned at the operational-tactical level (commander of an army corps – division).

The tasks of special forces in operational-tactical operations include attacks on military bases and concentration sites of enemy troops within the operational direction; liberation of friendly prisoners of war; destruction of senior command personnel of enemy troops; organization of false attacks with the aim of misleading the enemy and saving the forces of friendly troops; disruption of the work of operational and troop rear, lines of communication and maneuver routes; capture and destruction of important troop command facilities and nuclear attack weapons; agent and troop reconnaissance; raids and ambushes on the routes of advance of the enemy’s second echelons and reserves.

Responsibility for the comprehensive provision of special operations rests with the commander (commander), who exercises direct operational control during their implementation.

Depending on the developing international situation and target settings, special operations can be carried out in the form of reconnaissance, sabotage and special actions; subversive actions using special tactics; actions to ensure the internal security of states.

During guerrilla operations aimed at overthrowing an undesirable regime in any country, special forces units organize, train and lead local rebel detachments, determine the need for weapons and military equipment, take an active part in their delivery and distribution, plan the actions of local forces, and directly participate in the most important subversive activities. The actions of special forces groups are in some cases supported by special army aviation, air force units, psychological operations units and liaison with the civil administration.

Conducting counter-insurgency (counter-guerrilla) operations involves similar actions, which are carried out in combination with economic, political and ideological measures. The combat use of “green berets” in medium and high-level conflicts is distinguished by its large scale and the involvement of significant forces and resources.

World experience shows that the process of preparing and waging a guerrilla (counter-guerrilla) war can be divided into several stages: political and psychological preparation for a guerrilla war; contacts between representatives of special forces and future local leaders of the guerrilla movement and underground, as well as with illegally operating intelligence agents; penetration of specialists from special forces into the area of ​​future guerrilla operations; organization of the guerrilla movement; deployment of guerrilla warfare; use of guerrilla forces; centralization of leadership of the guerrilla movement; dissolution of guerrilla formations after the end of hostilities.

A special place in special operations is occupied by units of the “Ranger” type. The most common method of their special operations is raids. These include actions characterized by rapidity, suddenness of strikes, delivered on vital objects with the purpose of putting them out of action or completely destroying them. The success of raids is ensured by the rapid movement of these units along a certain route, extensive use of maneuver and a quick exit from the battle. Raids, as a rule, do not provide for the capture and holding of objects on enemy territory. The distinctive feature of the Ranger actions from the actions of the “Green Berets” is their duration: Ranger raids are fleeting and provide for an exit to their territory after completing the tasks assigned to them. Raids are usually conducted at night with the purpose of destroying important state, economic or military objects, disrupting communication lines, physically eliminating or kidnapping famous political leaders and military figures.

Reconnaissance by Ranger forces involves determining the precise coordinates of stationary and moving targets, marking them with radio beacons for subsequent strikes on them by aircraft or naval forces, and obtaining intelligence information on the deployment, strength, and armament of enemy military and paramilitary formations. Ranger-type battalions and companies can be used as light infantry units to assist special forces groups. They operate independently or in conjunction with special forces units and local allied formations.

Another form of special operations using special forces is psychological operations, which are carried out in response to crises or conflicts at all levels and pursue the following goals: to assist the government of a specific host country in winning support among the masses and in undermining the positions and influence of organizations and parties that are opponents of the regime; to prevent the spread of negative sentiments and to create the impression that their assistance is selfless.

The main functions in carrying out operations of this type are assigned to special units and subdivisions of psychological operations, which are deliberately introduced directly into the structure of special forces and can either act independently or be attached to these units. Subdivisions of psychological operations solve problems of conducting propaganda, ideological processing of prisoners and internees, collecting information about the moods, intentions of individual groups and the needs of the population. In recent years, psychological operations have been carried out many times in various regions of the world: the Persian Gulf zone, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, etc. At present, Western specialists in the field of psychological operations are present on a temporary or permanent rotational basis in zones of potential or existing conflicts.

Maintenance of internal order in the host country is carried out jointly with the local civil and military administration bodies and provides for the implementation of measures to provide assistance within the framework of the “ensuring internal security” program; development of a set of special measures; training of civil administration units in the armed forces of the allies. In conflicts aimed at overthrowing the existing regime, the formation of links with the civil administration organizes temporary governing bodies in the captured territory, and in case of success, a new structure of local government bodies is created.

Naval special operations have been developed based on the experience of local conflicts that took place in the 1970s–90s and new theoretical developments that examine the prospective capabilities of special operations forces. Naval special operations forces are used to conduct operations in territorial waters, as well as in the coastal strip of territory to a depth of up to 20 km. Special operations, based on the experience of Western countries, include actions against enemy ships and vessels at anchorages and in bases, dispersal areas and temporary basing areas; reconnaissance and destruction of anti-landing obstacles and natural obstacles in the water and on the shore; demining passages for landing craft in landing areas; mining coastal waters and enemy port waters; reconnaissance and sabotage actions in the coastal strip with the aim of destroying important military, military-industrial and transport facilities.

Support for the actions of the Navy’s special operations forces is provided by detachments of special vehicles and detachments of boats, designed to deliver special forces units to designated areas, evacuate them, and provide fire support.

All of the above provisions regarding the combat use of special operations forces, which were theoretically reflected in special regulatory documents, were confirmed and developed in practice: during the operation to seize Grenada, during military operations against Libya, during military operations in Panama, in the Persian Gulf, during military operations against Iraq, during peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

In accordance with their mission, special operations forces may also take part in non-combat actions dictated by the national interests of the country. These actions are called stabilization operations.

The frequency, intensity, forms and methods of using special forces units and subdivisions in operations to stabilize the situation change depending on the developing military-political situation in a specific theater of military operations.

Stabilization operations may be conducted before the start of military actions in a period of threat, during military actions or after their completion. Such operations are intended to ensure regional stability, support or achieve Western values, maintain influence and access to any regions of the world, provide humanitarian aid and protect their own interests. The military-political leadership of Western countries carries out measures to participate in these operations in accordance with the guidelines of national military-strategic concepts. They minimize the need for participation in military or combat actions and contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Stabilization operations do not always end peacefully. Despite existing restrictions on the use of military force, troops participating in such operations certainly retain the right to self-defense.

Assistance in ensuring the internal security of a foreign state in peacetime is a core activity in operations to stabilize the situation and consists of assisting local authorities in pursuing a pro-Western policy based on local resources. This involves creating long-term stability, promoting the development of relevant government institutions and the country’s infrastructure, a market economy, and regulated political and economic processes.

By providing assistance in ensuring internal security, the supply of weapons, military training and education of personnel of the armed forces of the host country is carried out in the interests of Western countries.

Humanitarian and civil assistance is provided by decision of one’s own government or at the request of foreign governments (international organizations) and includes assistance to refugees, food supplies, medical supplies, restoration of law and order, assessment of the extent of damage caused, etc.

Support for the fight against drug trafficking complements, but does not replace, the military component of civilian government actions.

Peacekeeping operations complement diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in potential conflict zones. Peacekeeping forces deter warring parties or forces involved in a conflict from armed clashes and acts of violence.

Participation in arms control helps maintain military-strategic stability.

The fight against terrorism is divided into two main components: anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. In peacetime, the main emphasis is on anti-terrorism, which is passive defensive measures aimed at minimizing vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Anti-terrorism is complemented by counter-terrorism, which is a full-scale offensive measure to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks. Counter-terrorism measures are carried out during wars and conflicts, and counter-terrorism measures are carried out across the entire spectrum of armed forces operations.

A show of force is carried out with the aim of demonstrating the determination to influence a situation fraught with threats to national interests. It increases confidence in a country ready to fulfill its obligations, strengthens its influence in the region and demonstrates the determination to implement the current military-political course.

The evacuation of civilians is carried out to remove people at risk from a foreign state or from the territory of the host country.

Support for insurgent and counter-insurgent actions is carried out by special forces on the instructions of their military-political leadership to solve political, economic, informational and purely military tasks with the help of military force.

Support to civil administration activities in one’s own country is provided for disaster relief, counter-narcotics operations, counter-terrorism activities and similar activities.

As the practice of the post-war period shows, special actions are conducted not only in wartime, but also in peacetime. Although in most cases they are of an auxiliary and supporting nature, their role in modern conditions is increasing, as evidenced by events in the world. The forms, methods and tasks of special actions are determined by the course and conditions of armed confrontation in wartime and the development of the military-political situation in the period of peaceful existence.

In a number of cases, special actions, such as destabilization of the situation, creation of a guerrilla-insurgent movement, disabling key infrastructure facilities, taking control of the situation, restoring the situation during peacekeeping operations with the subsequent transfer of power to friendly forces, have strategic significance and are capable of radically changing the balance of power in favor of the country conducting them.

The scale of the tasks solved during special operations in wartime is very, very significant: from sabotage in control and communication centers to disabling missile launchers, from actions in the enemy’s rear in the main directions to the destruction of senior and mid-level command personnel. At the same time, in any military operation, special operations are mainly of an auxiliary nature and ensure the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the armed forces.

In peacetime conditions, the workload on special operations forces increases, and their role and importance in conducting operations to stabilize the situation increases.

Conducting special operations requires the presence of such forces (troops), the forms and methods of action of which, as well as their organization and armament, would differ from conventional forces (troops). Personnel of special operations forces undergo a thorough selection process and special training to perform special tasks in addition to the usual, basic forms of training in military registration specialties adopted in the armed forces. Special training programs make it impossible to quickly replace or generate personnel and their capabilities.

The Special Operations Forces personnel consists of mature and experienced military personnel, many of whom are highly qualified specialists in several military specialties.

The training of special operations forces is carried out taking into account the characteristics of the regions where they may be used, including linguistic and cultural specifics.

Special operations forces cannot replace conventional forces, they are only a necessary addition to existing conventional capabilities. Depending on the prevailing conditions, special operations forces can act independently or jointly with conventional forces. They can complement and reinforce the actions of conventional forces to accomplish a given task, which would be impossible without their use. Special skills in armed confrontation and the ability to act covertly make it possible to respond adequately to the situation or crisis conditions that require the pinpoint, measured use of force.

Direct actions of special operations forces are short-term raids and other small-scale offensive actions conducted with the purpose of capturing, destroying, capturing and damaging the enemy’s personnel and equipment, as well as freeing and returning captured servicemen and military equipment to their troop locations. For these purposes, ambushes are used, raids are conducted, assault tactics are used; mines and other explosive devices are laid; fire is fired to kill from a safe distance from the air, land, and sea platforms; high-precision weapons are used; anti-ship actions are conducted; sabotage actions are used.

Raids, ambushes, and assault actions are intended to achieve planned results at the strategic or operational level, often dependent on time factors. They are conducted in zones beyond the range of tactical weapons and where conventional forces do not operate. Such operations typically include attacks on important objects; the search for and capture of certain individuals and weapons; the destruction or incapacitation of enemy property to support the actions of friendly forces in the zone of the upcoming offensive.

Strikes are carried out from a safe distance for the attacking side using the weapons systems available in service. These actions are considered to be independent in nature when the object is significantly damaged or destroyed without direct contact with the enemy.

Targeting actions are carried out with the aim of adjusting fire on pre-selected objects.

Liberation operations are conducted with the aim of discovering the location and returning to the deployment area of ​​military personnel or equipment captured by the enemy, or in the event of a clear threat of their capture. Liberation operations are characterized by careful planning, detailed analysis of intelligence data, and preliminary training in exercises of the assigned tasks.

They are distinguished by special forms and methods of action of the ground component of special operations forces, the covert nature of the search with reliance on local forces.

Operations for the pinpoint destruction of objects using directed explosions are carried out on targets where only minimal or indirect damage is acceptable. They are carried out in cases where there is no guarantee of obtaining the required result when using high-precision weapons or when it is not the object itself that must be destroyed, but its contents.

Actions against ground targets are carried out against all enemy targets, including personnel. Amphibious operations are carried out by landing forces and with appropriate support from the sea with landing on the coastal strip occupied by the enemy. They include reconnaissance and sabotage activities carried out before landing, support of naval artillery, guidance to landing sites on the coast of amphibious forces, monitoring the level of ebb and flow of the tides, clearing the obstacle course

Mine warfare involves the laying of mines at strategic and operational levels and the use of appropriate countermeasures to similar actions by the enemy. The activities carried out for these purposes include the creation of minefields during the offensive and defensive phases, the determination of the location of enemy minefields, and the search for and demining of underwater mines installed at shallow depths.

Special reconnaissance includes: environmental reconnaissance, during which vital information on the hydrographic, geological and meteorological conditions of the area is collected; reconnaissance using fire weapons, which mainly pertains to aerial reconnaissance, the content of which is to deliver fire strikes while in the air at emerging enemy targets – personnel, weapons, equipment along designated reconnaissance areas or ground communication lines (note that this type of reconnaissance is not intended to deliver strikes on specifically detected targets); Coastal patrolling and isolation of an area, as a type of combat support, is the obstruction of enemy actions in any area, isolation of an area, and reconnaissance in coastal areas (the purpose of such actions is to nullify the enemy’s combat capabilities or limit them by disrupting the functioning of communication lines through which means of movement and support arrive; in this case, coastal patrolling and isolation of an area can be either an independent task or actions to support the landing of amphibious forces, blockade of a coastal area, or counter-narcotics operations); assessment of the nature of the target and threat capabilities consists of detection, determination, location, and assessment of the target in order to select the most effective means of destroying it or in studying the results of using conventional or nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Reconnaissance after strikes is conducted in order to collect information to assess their results.

Ensuring the internal defense of a foreign state, as applied to special operations forces, consists of their participation in the organization, training, and combat preparation of regular and irregular formations in the host country with the aim of maintaining internal stability and combating subversive activities and violence. Successful fulfillment of these tasks meets the long-term goals of U.S. military policy.

“Unconventional” warfare is the action of a wide range of regular and irregular formations, usually long-term in time and carried out mainly by local forces, formed, equipped, supplied and controlled to varying degrees of intensity by means of foreign instructors, supplies of weapons and financial resources. “Unconventional warfare” implies the conduct of guerrilla warfare and other secret or covert operations of an offensive nature, as well as the commission of acts of sabotage, subversive actions, reconnaissance and passage through enemy-occupied territory to the location of friendly troops.

Guerrilla warfare is conducted in the form of combat and other actions by local forces on enemy-occupied territory or in areas with an unstable domestic political situation. It is an open manifestation of an insurgency or any other armed resistance. The main methods of tactical struggle are raids and ambushes.

The main essence of the fight against terrorism is anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist actions taken across the entire spectrum of terrorist threats. The role of special operations forces in the fight against terrorism is to prevent, alert and resolve cases of terrorism. At the direction of the military-political leadership or the appropriate official, special operations forces may conduct or support counter-terrorism operations, including the release of hostages; the elimination of life-threatening materials in the possession of terrorist organizations, as well as attacks on terrorist infrastructure facilities. Special operations forces may participate in strengthening security measures to protect military personnel and events.

Psychological operations are planned actions to convey selective information to a foreign audience in order to influence their feelings, motivations, and reasoning abilities for subsequent influence in the desired direction on government structures, organizations, public groups, and even individuals. The task of conducting psychological operations in relation to a foreign audience is to develop certain beliefs and to reinforce these beliefs that correspond to the set goals of the country conducting psychological operations.

Special Operations Forces conduct psychological operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Using knowledge of language, culture and local customs, Special Operations Forces units provide field commanders with greater opportunities to exert psychological influence depending on the developing situation. Civil liaison units have as their main purpose to assist commanders in establishing communications and friendly relations with the local administration and civilian population of the country. Personnel of civil liaison units seek to justify the legitimacy of conducting a particular operation on the territory of other states, thereby contributing to increasing their effectiveness.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction contributes to increased regional instability and provides terrorist organizations with access to new weapons. Special Operations Forces participate in or support operations to deter or prevent the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction, participate in the elimination of threats to their use, and destroy their delivery vehicles.

Special Operations Forces are staffed, trained and equipped to perform their primary tasks. However, in some cases, based on the specifics of the military-political situation, they may participate in the performance of additional tasks, which include the following: supporting the actions of coalition forces; searching for and rescuing military personnel in a combat situation; combating the spread of drugs; participating in mine clearance operations; participating in humanitarian aid programs abroad; providing assistance in ensuring security and performing special tasks, the results of which are never publicly recognized.

AS WE SEE, our potential enemy treats guerrilla warfare and other unconventional methods of waging armed struggle quite seriously. When we talk about the inertia of the American military and their unhealthy commitment to traditions, we should take a closer look at what is being done in the Russian army and how. Today, we must admit that in terms of the technical equipment of the troops, the quality of personnel training and the material conditions of service, our army is lagging very, very far behind. Individual elite units that have really good training and individual successful models of combat equipment and weapons that have no analogues in the world, but which we also have in single copies, do not count. Based on this, it is time to think about what opponents can really threaten us in the near future and how we can resist them.

The enemy, which has dominance in the air, space, sea and information technology sphere, is NATO (and above all the USA). The only possible adequate way to achieve victory in such conditions is guerrilla (sabotage) warfare.

If guerrilla methods of armed struggle were quite effective before, today their importance has increased even more. There are several reasons for this. First of all, regular armies have become even more dependent on the stable work of rear services. Secondly, most models of modern military equipment and weapons are very vulnerable – they can be disabled even with minor damage. Finally, the third reason is the sharp increase in the real combat capabilities of portable weapons (ATGMs, RPGs, MANPADS, various mines and landmines), which can be used by guerrillas.

According to a number of experts, “the use of these types of weapons in the enemy’s rear in ambushes and raids turned out to be tens of times more effective than in open combat at the front… It is generally accepted that the combat potential of a hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher in relation to the combat potential of a tank is 1:10. That is, in order to destroy 1 tank, it is necessary to counter it with 10 RPGs, since while the grenade launcher fires from an accessible distance and hits the tank’s vulnerable spot, the latter will have time to destroy 9 grenade launchers with a gun and machine guns. However, in a sabotage or guerrilla war, the situation changes dramatically, and the combat potentials of a tank and an RPG can become equal, or even change in favor of the grenade launcher. According to calculations, the effectiveness of using anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and land mines in special ways in the enemy’s rear increases by 60-70 times compared to their installation in traditional minefields. The probability of aircraft and helicopter destruction increases sharply when using MANPADS during takeoff and landing in the area of ​​airfields and on flight routes in the enemy rear compared to the use of MANPADS in the combat formations of troops. An increase in combat capabilities is noted when using almost most types of weapons and equipment when they are used in special ways in the enemy rear (on territory fully or partially controlled by the enemy). Two countries – the USSR and the USA – created small-sized nuclear landmines carried by 2-3 reconnaissance saboteurs. Therefore, the myths that have appeared about the phenomenal capabilities of special forces have some objective basis.”

The use of guerrilla methods of armed struggle can become a decisive factor in conducting defensive actions against possible armed aggression from much stronger opponents.

But let’s not forget the bloody experience of military operations in Chechnya. It is quite possible that this “low-intensity conflict” is not the last one on Russian territory. And this, in turn, means that we need to work out such a scenario as military operations against irregular armed formations. In this case, the fight against partisan, insurgent and other irregular armed formations, as well as against sabotage and reconnaissance groups and special operations forces of foreign armies will be the main part of military operations in all theaters of military operations.

But in either of these two scenarios, only well-trained and appropriately equipped special forces units, operating with the support of army aviation and airmobile units, can play a decisive role.

Let us recall that back in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the legendary Denis Davydov worked out in practice and in theory the optimal Russian model of guerrilla actions (“…for us, Russians, guerrilla warfare will always be extremely necessary and useful”), which are carried out by regular military units. These units must be mobile (according to Davydov – “flying detachments” of light cavalry), well armed and specially trained to conduct specific combat operations in the enemy rear, capable, if necessary, of becoming the core for inciting a people’s war. These detachments must be commanded by experienced, proactive officers who possess the art of guerrilla warfare. In other words, no matter what form the guerrilla war is conducted in, it must be well prepared.

It is hardly worth presenting here a possible concept of domestic special forces – Russia still has competent officers with combat experience in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, who can create a theoretical basis on the basis of their experience, develop optimal training programs, select and properly train personnel. Russian officers are capable of much, very much – all that is needed is the state will, support at the highest level. Russian civilian and military leaders must finally recognize the fundamental changes in military affairs that have occurred in recent years and develop a serious and well-thought-out philosophy of war (similar to that developed by Clausewitz, Jomini and Schlieffen) that is appropriate to the present day — it is necessary for understanding and correctly comprehending the nature and essence of a new type of war in the conditions of the modern world. In turn, a Russian military doctrine must be created on the basis of this philosophy, in which priority must be given to guerrilla warfare in all its forms. The Russian military doctrine must provide not only for the possibility of conducting large-scale guerrilla operations on its territory captured by the enemy, but also for possible methods and techniques of conducting counterinsurgency operations. The further development of the Russian Armed Forces must be carried out in accordance with this new doctrine — with an orientation toward actions in a “small war”; At the same time, mobile, highly professionally trained and well-equipped Special Forces must be created within the Russian Armed Forces – oriented specifically towards actions in conditions of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. Only in this case will Russia and its army be ready for those wars that may well happen in the 21st century and the new millennium.

Autore: Oleg Ryazanov

Fonte: Bratishka. 2008. No. 1-3 (MILITERA)