Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare: Theory and Practice (I)

DOZENS of more or less large-scale local conflicts that took place during the 20th century, as well as the experience of using guerrilla methods of armed struggle during World War II, allow us to make some generalizations and conclusions. Despite all their enormous diversity in political, military and geographical conditions, it is possible to identify some patterns inherent in most guerrilla wars and insurgent movements.

Russian specialists in the field of “small war” in their theoretical developments rely primarily on the authority of Professor I.G. Starinov, who worked very seriously and deeply in this field for many years. Having carefully studied and analyzed the combat guerrilla experience accumulated during the most significant wars and armed conflicts of the 19th-20th centuries, as well as the theoretical legacy of many authors of works on guerrilla warfare, he came to the important conclusion that guerrilla warfare is one of the forms of armed struggle. No matter how strange it may sound, official military science in Russia still diligently “does not notice” guerrilla warfare as a method.

As is known, any war is, by its very nature, a confrontational policy, which is carried out using all available ways, methods, means and tools. War can be waged not only by force; there are several ways of waging war. Thus, methods of waging war include psychological influence on the enemy, political and diplomatic pressure, economic measures of influence and, finally, armed struggle – from individual sabotage and terrorist acts to a full-scale world war. Armed struggle, in turn, uses armed forces, special services (intelligence and counterintelligence) and partisan (or rebel) formations as means.

Military actions can be of a traditional type (they are also called “dichotomous”, which means dividing a single whole in half) and asymmetrical. Traditional military actions are divided into two main types, interconnected and mutually subordinate – offensive and defensive. If one of the parties deliberately refuses the classical method of waging war, stubbornly avoids open forms of armed struggle, using mainly guerrilla, sabotage and other special operations, then military actions acquire an asymmetrical character. In other words, guerrilla forms and methods of military actions are resorted to in cases where open armed struggle with a superior enemy has no real chance of success; however, it is precisely this asymmetrical war that in many cases gives the weaker side the only chance of victory.

Such concepts as “partisan struggle”, “partisan war” and “partisan movement” differ significantly from each other. Thus, partisan struggle is understood as armed actions of the masses against an aggressor or their own, internal, anti-democratic regime. The main and determining armed force in this case are partisan units, detachments and groups from among volunteers. In addition to them, underground combat organizations (“urban partisans”), as well as regular troops, can participate in the struggle. Separate units of regular troops can be specially trained and then withdrawn to the enemy’s rear; but these can also be regular units that are forced to switch to partisan methods of struggle due to the prevailing combat situation.

If the partisan struggle is actively supported by the local population, then partisan operations are often supplemented by other forms of resistance of the population to the enemy – strikes, agitation and propaganda, sabotage. In this case, we can talk about a partisan movement in this region or country.

What is the art of guerrilla warfare in the light of today? It includes the organization and training of guerrilla forces, as well as comprehensive support and conduct of guerrilla operations. Such a definition of the art of guerrilla warfare certainly includes such concepts as specific – specifically guerrilla – strategy, tactics and operational art.

I.G. Starinov believed that partisan strategy should cover the theory and practice of preparing and conducting strategic operations conducted jointly with regular troops, or constitute the main component of achieving strategic goals in an independent partisan war. In the first case, strategy determines the planning and conduct of individual strategic operations of partisans; in the second case, the entire partisan war.

Guerrilla strategy and the practical activities of the leadership of guerrilla forces must not allow actions that would alert the enemy during the course of operations, so as not to cause him to undertake difficult or even completely insurmountable counter-guerrilla measures before the completion of operations that will achieve the set goal.

The most important factors influencing the success or failure of guerrilla warfare are considered to be the following: the military-political situation in the region; the enemy forces, their qualitative composition and level of armament, as well as the counter-guerrilla tactics they have chosen; the potential for creating guerrilla (or insurgent) formations; the social environment in which the guerrilla warfare unfolds. In addition, if we are talking about waging guerrilla warfare against a foreign aggressor, then an important factor is the results of combat operations by the regular army on the main front of military operations and the level of preparedness of the state to wage guerrilla warfare.

In strategic terms, the full cycle of the full development of a “small war” can be divided into three successive stages – defense, equilibrium, and attack. Partisan experts believe that the sequence of the attack and the change of these phases is very important: when ascending to higher levels, skipping or hasty passage of previous phases is not allowed, during which quantitative and qualitative factors accumulate, the totality of which marks the onset of the next one.

Usually, the beginning of active resistance is associated with the actions of several or even just one armed detachment. The first partisans at this stage penetrate deep into hard-to-reach areas and create strongholds there. Then the development of the area begins – contact with the local population is established, reconnaissance is conducted, supply channels are organized, new fighters are recruited, and active propaganda of the movement is conducted. These tasks are the most important for this stage, so the first cautious combat sorties of the partisans are usually directly related to their solution. This is the “defensive phase”.

Gradually, the range of the partisans’ actions increases, the number of detachments and the effectiveness of combat operations grow. As a result, a partisan region (or zone) is formed, adjacent to the support base.

If the partisan or insurgent movement was not nipped in the bud and managed to survive the first stage of its development, then a moment comes when the initial area for partisan units becomes too cramped. Then part of the partisan forces are sent to develop another area using the same methods. Such expansion of the partisans will continue further, and on an ever-increasing scale. By this time, there are already enough weapons, ammunition and explosives obtained from the enemy and purchased in other countries to supply the partisan (insurgent) army, create secret warehouses outside the already developed areas and begin arming part of the population supporting the movement.

It is characteristic that at this stage the features of regularity begin to appear, which usually manifests itself in the fact that the best part of the partisan army is singled out and isolated, armed with the best weapons, staffed with the best commanders and fighters. Such special shock detachments are already capable of solving a wide range of combat tasks, therefore they play the role of guards for the partisan command. At the same time, the command does not forget to continue to form new detachments, the people’s militia and self-defense forces. Thus, both components are simultaneously developing – the armed masses of the people and the part of the partisan army “gravitating toward regularity.”

Another typical indicator for this stage is the increasing politicization of the war, and the Resistance forces are increasingly transformed from a purely military organization into a military-political one. In addition, the “struggle for the hearts and minds” of the local population is becoming increasingly important, so some operations are already being carried out for reasons of political expediency.

This stage is called the “balance phase” because the active development of support bases, the expansion of partisan zones and increasingly daring and large-scale partisan operations bring the moment closer when the fight against the growing partisan movement becomes the main task for the occupation (or government) army. The fierce confrontation between irregular and regular troops becomes the main content of the war.

According to the authors of the monograph “The Army and Internal Troops in Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare”, it is the second phase of the war that is the real school of guerrilla military art, the main lessons of which are taught by the enemy, who adheres to opposite principles: “It is no coincidence that guerrillas are called the Jesuits of war, since their entire struggle is subject to only one law of expediency and rationality in all their actions. Being in survival mode most of the time, in every possible way preserving their own forces, being at the same time strongly dependent on the enemy (his actions and his supplies), but immeasurably freer than he is in choosing the forms and methods of action, they often use methods that are truly asymmetrical to the enemy’s methods, contraindicated and even destructive for him. They are infinitely inventive in methods of evading attacks, in achieving surprise, initiative and freedom of action, in imposing conditions that are advantageous only to them, in the originality and uniqueness of the steps taken, in camouflage and concealment of their true intentions.”

Constant individual and collective improvisation, genuine democracy in decision-making and determining the methods of their implementation elevate guerrilla warfare to the level of genuine art, disdaining serial fakes and each time surprising the enemy with unique finds. War actively develops the creative beginnings of the personality of an ordinary soldier and commander, who are forced to be in constant search. In essence, each detachment is a miniature army, differing from others in composition, weapons, experience, as well as the personal qualities of its commander.

Che Guevara writes in his book “Guerrilla Warfare” that “in contrast to the frozen methods of classical warfare, guerrillas invent their own tactics at every moment and thus constantly take the enemy by surprise.”

Finally, the final phase, the “offensive phase,” is marked by maneuvering actions by both opposing sides over most of the territory. The entire partisan army emerges from its secret bases, from the urban underground, and “persistently offers” the regular enemy to measure their strength in open combat. Partisan formations, independently or in cooperation with the regular army, respond to each enemy attack with a strike, conducting increasingly large-scale and effective operations with the goal of achieving stable control over vast territories. Such actions can already be characterized as a strategic offensive in several operational directions. As a rule, it ends with the blocking of enemy garrisons and field groups in large cities and populated areas.

However, even in this final phase we will not see the traditional clash of the two armies. There will be no general battle, no “final assault”: the partisans remain true to their strategy and prefer to strive for victory by accumulating small successes. On the other hand, the partisan army, including its “regular” part, continues to act contrary to military canons, using outflanking and enveloping tactics, carefully avoiding concentrated actions in front of the enemy front, positional battles and direct exchanges of blows.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that guerrilla warfare most often does not have sufficient potential to destroy the enemy’s state apparatus, but it does cause such fatigue and internal “corrosion” of this apparatus that over time only a useless external “shell” remains. Therefore, in “small wars” the day of victory often comes suddenly.

I.G. Starinov, defining the operational art (or minor strategy) of partisan forces, noted that it “encompasses the theory and practice of preparing and implementing operations capable of cutting off enemy troops from their supply sources in a war against an aggressor using ground and underground transport, capturing bridgeheads when crossing rivers, water barriers, as well as other operations that contribute to the success of the actions of their regular troops.”

All guerrilla warfare must be based on the principles of operational art and expressed in the preparation and conduct of combat operations on an operational scale by guerrilla formations. Such actions may include operations to simultaneously disable the most important military, industrial or transport facilities over a large territory; operations to combat large punitive enemy groups; operations in the interests of regular troops.

Finally, guerrilla tactics comprise the theory and practice of preparing and implementing actions by individuals, groups, detachments and units in conspiracy, movement, overcoming enemy counter-guerrilla measures and implementing assigned tasks and inflicting damage on the enemy without engaging in combat, as well as forced defensive actions. P. Karatygin described guerrilla tactics as follows: “Guerrilla tactics are the use of all known moments in the hostile side’s situation (regardless of whether in time or space), “snatching” these moments, acting on one of the components of the situation, regardless of its other data.

In essence, this tactic is a violation of the enemy’s external tactical methods, the dismemberment of his forces, the paralysis of the enemy’s well-organized system of organization, control and actions by contrasting accidents and surprises, i.e. those conditions in which many of the advantages of regular troops, connected by this system, are lost.”

Open combat actions, such as offensive and defensive actions, are not typical of guerrilla warfare at all. This is due to the limited combat capabilities of the guerrillas, the inevitable large losses among them and, consequently, low efficiency. However, they cannot be completely excluded, of course.

Thus, a partisan offensive is possible mainly at night and in conditions of limited visibility. It is carried out with the aim of capturing the most important objects or lines, as well as during a breakout from encirclement. Another situation may arise when during the raid it was not possible to achieve surprise, the enemy managed to organize the defense of the object. And then, in order to fulfill the combat mission, an offensive of partisan forces can take place.

In an offensive, the partisans’ combat formations are most often built in one echelon with a strong reserve allocated, and a fire group is always created. The most tactically difficult is an offensive battle with the goal of getting the partisans out of encirclement. Success here is usually associated with careful reconnaissance, the correct choice of the direction of the main attack, and surprise. During a breakthrough, the headquarters and rear units of the partisans with a cover group should follow the first echelon.

Partisans can conduct defense to repel an attack by punitive forces on the base area, to ensure other tactical or operational tasks, or to hold important objects in the interests of regular troops.

The combat formations of partisan formations during defense may include the first echelon, a fire group, a group of diversionary actions, a reserve, and sabotage groups to work in the rear of the advancing enemy. In addition, in the event of a retreat from the defended area, a rearguard is assigned to cover, which conducts a holding battle on intermediate defensive lines.

One of the main principles of guerrilla tactics was aptly formulated by Mao Zedong: “The enemy advances – we retreat, the enemy has stopped – we harass, the enemy is tired – we strike, the enemy retreats – we pursue.” There are circumstances when guerrillas must defend themselves. This happens, for example, when defending liberated areas. But even in these cases, the actions of the guerrillas are offensive in nature. The defense must begin at distant approaches and represent a series of constant attacks on enemy troops, so that, having captured the territory and thus formally achieved their goal, they would be exhausted, weighed down by the killed and wounded, have lost their fighting spirit and the “saving bonds of subordination.” Thus, defeat turns into victory.

In all other cases, for example, in the event of a sudden attack by enemy troops on a partisan camp, the goal of defense is not to defeat the enemy, but to create conditions for a retreat or breakout from encirclement. Partisans must be able to neutralize the strengths of the regular army, which consist primarily of gigantic firepower and virtually inexhaustible reserves of weapons, ammunition, food and ammunition.

Another tactic widely used by guerrillas all over the world is the so-called “belt grab”. Fighting at hand grenade throwing range compensates for the lack of heavy weapons and does not give the enemy the opportunity to realize their advantage in firepower. One of the main features of guerrilla tactics is constant and, if possible, covert maneuvering. Guerrillas must move, according to Mao Zedong, “like flowing water and a swift wind.” A stop, in the broad sense of the word, entails the danger of encirclement and the death of a guerrilla detachment. Such maneuvering allows you to deceive the enemy in full accordance with the aphorism of Sun Tzu: “When the target is close, show (the enemy) that it is far away; when it is really far, create the impression that it is close.” If the guerrillas are constantly on the move, then air and artillery strikes will be carried out on empty space, and enemy troops will aimlessly waste fuel, ammunition, food and vehicle resources. The presence of heavy weapons should not limit the maneuverability of the partisans. Anything that cannot be carried away should be hidden or destroyed.

If, for one reason or another (for example, unfavorable terrain, the presence of a large number of wounded and sick), the possibilities for maneuvering are limited, it is necessary to use a network of well-camouflaged natural and artificial shelters (“caches”). Thus, fighters of the People’s Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) built and used a huge number of underground structures. In this case, special attention was paid to camouflage. In this art, the Vietnamese achieved unprecedented mastery: the enemy discovered the Viet Cong bunkers only when they opened fire. If this did not happen, then American and South Vietnamese soldiers combing the jungle could literally be over the heads of the partisans for weeks.

Considering the very specificity of partisan actions, the main methods of solving combat missions are ambushes, raids (including fire raids) and sabotage.

The forces allocated to set up an ambush depend on the situation and can include up to 30–40 people, and sometimes more.

When organizing an ambush, the partisan commander determines the location of the ambush, the locations of obstacles (mines, landmines, rubble) on the enemy’s route, the battle formation, the order of opening fire, the actions of the fighters to capture equipment, prisoners, trophies and documents, as well as the order of retreat to the assembly point after completing the combat mission.

The ambush site is chosen in such terrain areas where the enemy is forced to reduce the speed of movement and where his view and maneuver will be limited. Therefore, it is best to set up ambushes in places where roads narrow, in gorges, ravines and canyons.

The battle formation in an ambush usually consists of 1–2 assault groups, a support group, and a reserve group.

The order of opening fire plays a significant role in the success of an ambush – a special signal is set for this. If an ambush is set up against a column, then fire is first opened on the lead and rear vehicles, and only then transferred to the rest. The attack on the designated objects is also carried out on a separate signal.

An ambush can also be mobile; when setting up mobile ambushes, all elements of the partisans’ combat formations are in motion: the partisans, dressed in the enemy’s uniform, approach the ambush target or overtake it, and then carry out an attack.

In modern conditions, partisans increasingly set up ambushes on the flight routes of enemy helicopters and light aircraft. Carefully camouflaged and equipped with MANPADS, partisan groups can cause quite serious damage to enemy air transport.

In general, the success of an ambush depends on the correct choice of location and time of its implementation, careful camouflage, reliable cover from sudden enemy attacks, successful placement and use of fire weapons and speed of action.

According to their intended purpose, ambushes are divided into ambushes for containment and ambushes for destruction (capture). The choice of the type of ambush is directly dependent on the combat situation, the balance of forces, terrain conditions and other factors. Ambushes, the main purpose of which is to slow down the advance of forces and means of bodies and troops, change their direction, force them to prematurely deploy in combat formation, require significantly fewer forces than ambushes for destruction. If only a few people are needed to contain a unit of up to a company for several hours, then its effective destruction is carried out by a comparable number of fighters.

Depending on the location, the combat formation used and the method of action, ambushes are divided into counter, parallel and circular. The recent “small war” in Chechnya gives us numerous examples of different types of ambushes.

A counter ambush is usually stationary and is set up along the route of the units’ advance in order to pin them down or defeat the vanguard units. It is often used against small units and vehicles moving independently. The ambush site is set up in advance, reserve and false positions are prepared, and escape routes are outlined. A counter ambush is often used simultaneously with a demonstration of a raid on some object to initiate the advance of reserves to it.

A parallel ambush is characterized by the fact that the targets of attacks by militants who relentlessly follow the direction of movement of the columns are the marching guard, reconnaissance, rear columns, and sometimes the main forces. In this case, the main forces of the militants are dispersed and located along the route of movement on one or both sides.

In August 2002, the commander of a motorized rifle regiment stationed in the Chechen Republic received operational information about the location of a cache of weapons and ammunition. The regiment’s reconnaissance company conducted a search, which resulted in the discovery and confiscation of a large quantity of small arms ammunition and mining equipment, including plastic explosives. The return to the post was carried out along the same route. The column was attacked by a group of militants. The armored personnel carrier bringing up the rear of the column was hit by RPGs, under-barrel grenade launchers, and small arms. After a direct hit from two grenades, the ammunition and the confiscated plastic explosives detonated. As a result of the combat clash, five servicemen were killed and nine people were injured to varying degrees. There is no information about the militants’ losses.

A circular ambush is the most difficult to prepare and conduct. When organizing it, groups of militants are positioned along the perimeter of a pre-selected area in anticipation of the advancing troops. The first of them, having opened fire on the flank of the column and started a fight, retreats, diverting attention and fire to itself.

Other groups act in a similar manner, consistently entering into battle and thus forcing troops to attack in different directions or repel an attack from several directions. Under certain conditions, control over the situation and management of forces and means may be lost, which dooms them to destruction.

Depending on the conditions and the task, ambushes usually involve ten to twenty, and in some cases more than a hundred people. In the latter case, they are usually located at several lines.

The composition of the detachment conducting the ambush varies depending on its purpose and the availability of forces. It may include: a fire or strike group; a distraction group; a group to prevent the maneuver and retreat of enemy forces and assets (holding down); a reserve group; an observation, communications, and information group. If equipment is available, the detachment includes a transport group.

The fire (strike) group is the main one. It destroys manpower and equipment, is located near the planned action zone and includes shooters, a subgroup for capturing prisoners and weapons, as well as demolition specialists.

The diversionary group is located at some distance from the action zone. Its task is to attract return fire from the security units (and sometimes the main forces), to ensure the sudden actions of the fire group. It begins the action first. The signal to begin may be the detonation of a mine or landmine.

In a number of cases, a diversionary group, located on the same line as the firing group, opens fire from a long distance at the approaching forces, retreats and, drawing the pursuing forces along with it, creates conditions for striking them in the flank.

The holding group, preventing the maneuver and retreat of the enemy forces and assets, takes up positions in the expected directions of their actions, as a rule, the only possible ones. It often covers them with mines and explosives and other obstacles.

The reserve, if necessary, reinforces the fire group or the group preventing maneuver and retreat. Its task is to ensure the exit from the battle and the retreat of the main forces of the detachment. It is also responsible for observation and cover of the detachment from the flanks and rear.

The observation, communications and information group does not participate in combat. Its area of ​​activity is reconnaissance, determining the time of departure of law enforcement forces and troops from their locations, composition and direction of movement.

The militants from its composition actively listen in on conversations in open radio networks, accompany the columns. Information about the movement is promptly sent to the main forces of the detachment. The personnel of the observation group can act without weapons, under the guise of a passing car that has “sat” on the tail of the column and then overtaken it.

The transport group disperses into shelters along the detachment’s retreat directions and is ready to evacuate the detachment, captured prisoners, and weapons.

An ambush usually lets the reconnaissance and security forces go ahead. By detonating a guided landmine, the militants disable the lead vehicles of the main forces, after which the fire is concentrated on the command and staff vehicles and the tail of the column. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and other powerful fire weapons are destroyed first.

In order to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, militants often set up active ambushes, that is, they deliberately lead federal forces to them through fake guides from among local residents.

In order to obtain advance information about the schedule of movement, the composition of the columns and the presence of security, work is actively carried out to plant agents at the points of formation of the columns. Observers with communication equipment are posted along the route.

Ambushes are carried out using both small groups (10-15 people) and large detachments (100-150 people). The battle formation usually includes observation, control, fire, capture, cover and distraction subgroups. The positions of the ambush groups are chosen in such a way as to ensure effective fire damage, reliable camouflage and hidden escape routes.

The main ambush forces are located along the road in groups of 3-4 people at a distance of 3-5 m from each other and 25-40 m from each group. RPGs, machine guns and snipers are placed on the flanks, and large-caliber machine guns are on the nearby heights.

As the column approaches the ambush site, reconnaissance and lead security are let through, and as they leave the ambush area, they are held down by a distraction group. At this time, the column comes under fire from the main forces of the ambush. Snipers usually open fire first on drivers and senior vehicle operators, and grenade launchers on armored vehicles. Concentrated fire is directed at the command and staff vehicles and vehicles with ammunition and fuel. The attack usually begins with the detonation of the lead vehicle on a guided land mine.

An example of such actions is the ambush set up by Chechen militants on the rear column of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment in April 1996. On a section of the road running along the western outskirts of Yaryshmardy, a high-explosive remote-controlled land mine blew up the lead tank. Then, fire from 2–3 RPGs destroyed the BMP-1KSh in which the column commander and air controller were located. VHF radio communications were suppressed by active interference. The column was blocked by fire from two directions and within an hour and a half, almost all the equipment and personnel were destroyed. Two detachments of militants, totaling up to 150 people, took part in the ambush.

From November 1995 to June 1996, Chechen militants carried out 5 ambushes in the Shatoi and Vedensky gorges, in which 106 servicemen were killed, 117 were wounded, 2 tanks, 12 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and 16 vehicles with supplies were destroyed.

The tactics of the “combat trio” (sniper, grenade launcher and machine gunner) are noteworthy. On the terrain, such a “combat trio” is dispersed. The machine gunner fires at the enemy, thereby drawing fire on himself. The sniper, having identified the firing points, hits them. Under the noise of the battle, the grenade launcher destroys armored vehicles.

The targets of attack for small groups and lone fighters are single vehicles or small columns, as well as military personnel (primarily officers and military personnel of the protective equipment).

A new element of the militants’ ambush tactics is the organization of fire ambushes at commanding heights with the aim of destroying federal troops’ aircraft on flight routes and takeoff and landing sites.

A raid is a sudden attack on an enemy object with the purpose of capturing or destroying it. Although a raid is quite an effective means, it requires a lot of time for preparation and is associated with almost inevitable human losses, so preference is given to short sudden attacks by small groups of partisans on poorly guarded objects.

The most important components of a raid are surprise and speed. If during a raid the enemy manages to occupy previously prepared and equipped positions, then the raid may well develop into a classic offensive battle, which is completely “contraindicated” for partisans.

Building a battle formation during an air raid is a creative task that requires a great deal of ingenuity and resourcefulness from the commander. Usually, a battle formation consists of assault (strike) groups, a fire group, support groups (cover and distraction actions), and a reserve group.

Assault groups are tasked with defeating the enemy and capturing the objective; cover groups prevent enemy reserves from approaching the target until the strike groups leave the target; diversionary action groups are created when open enemy resistance is expected at the target and when a significant amount of time is needed to complete the task: they distract the enemy by simulating an attack, carrying out sabotage, setting up ambushes, etc.

The raid is preceded by a thorough reconnaissance of the object in order to clarify the nature and mode of the object, the security and defense system, hidden approaches, the location of obstacles, the location of the nearest reserves and the probable routes of their movement to the object are determined.

Examples of raids can easily be found in the very recent events in the Chechen Republic. Thus, on August 7, 1999, Shamil Basayev’s detachment of 300 people invaded the territory of the Botlikh District of Dagestan. Small groups of militants had occupied nearby commanding heights in advance, blocking all roads and paths. At dawn, the main forces of the detachment, having divided into groups, occupied the villages of Ansalta, Rakhata and Tando, disarming the village police departments.

The most frequent attacks with the purpose of taking hostages, weapons and ammunition, and destroying combat and other equipment are carried out on checkpoints or individual strongholds. Attacks are mostly carried out on those posts that are a serious obstacle for militants during their movements and convoys.

Depending on the importance of the post and the number of personnel guarding it, both small groups of 5-10 people and groups of up to 100 or more people are involved in the attack.

In December 1995 and March 1996, checkpoints of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 166th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade were captured. In both cases, the militants’ actions were approximately the same. Over the course of a week, several local residents established contacts with the personnel – they brought food, cigarettes, alcohol, and bought fuel and lubricants. Having lulled the personnel’s vigilance, the Chechens disarmed the sentries before dawn, and the combat groups captured the checkpoint and took the prisoners away in an unknown direction. The serviceable equipment was stolen.

A fire raid is a sudden destruction of enemy targets of limited size by mortar or artillery fire of partisans. The combat mission is accomplished without penetrating the target, which eliminates unnecessary losses. However, even in this case, partisan formations may still suffer losses if the enemy manages to quickly detect the partisans’ firing positions and organize their suppression by artillery fire or air strikes.

The most suitable objects for a fire attack are control points, radio stations, individual structures on railways and other communication routes.

When conducting a fire raid, the combat formation consists of a fire group, a cover group, and a reserve group. Groups of porters may be assigned to deliver ammunition to the firing position, or, if the situation allows, pack animals, vehicles, or other types of transport may be used.

The fire group is deployed to one or more firing positions and creates several observation posts for target designation and fire adjustment. Particular attention is paid to preparation for firing at night.

Initial data for shooting are prepared in advance, before the fire group moves into position. For this purpose, special reconnaissance groups or individual scouts are sent to the area of ​​the object in advance.

Cover groups occupy positions in those directions from which an enemy attack is possible.

In general, the success of a fire raid depends on careful reconnaissance of the target, the quality of preparation of the initial data for firing, the training of combat crews, secrecy when moving to a firing position, as well as the speed of winding down and retreating after completing a combat mission.

Sabotage is the destruction or disabling of military or state facilities in the enemy’s rear through the use of special means, primarily mines and explosives.

Sabotage is a method of combat that is most preferred by partisans, as it allows them to inflict significant material damage on the enemy without engaging in combat with them.

The objects for sabotage are usually command posts, enemy administration bodies, power plants, communication centers, airfields, communication routes, power lines, etc. It is sabotage, to a much greater extent than other methods of guerrilla warfare, that makes it possible to count on a systematic impact on the enemy’s most important objects and to interact in this way to the maximum extent with regular troops.

Those partisan formations that focus on sabotage in their struggle usually do not suffer large combat losses and retain the ability to continuously inflict strong blows on the enemy. Sabotage operations significantly expand the scope and capabilities of partisan warfare: neither open terrain, nor urban conditions, nor the strictest police regime can be an insurmountable obstacle for saboteurs.

The success of sabotage depends on many factors: the degree of preparedness of the partisans themselves to carry out sabotage; the availability of sabotage equipment or the ability to manufacture it on site; reliable and timely intelligence information about the object of sabotage; skillful selection of the time, method and means of committing sabotage; strict observance of camouflage and conspiracy during the preparation and implementation of sabotage.

To carry out the sabotage, a group of partisans or an individual executor is allocated. Having received the task, the commander of the partisan group must organize additional reconnaissance of the object in order to clarify its location, identify vulnerable spots, the security system and the regime in the area of ​​the object, as well as the possibilities of penetrating it. After additional reconnaissance, the group commander makes a decision to carry out the sabotage, then determines the procedure for penetrating the object and the method of carrying out the sabotage, the tasks of the executors, control and communication signals, routes and order of retreat, assembly points.

The means of committing sabotage may be improvised explosive devices, standard mine-explosive equipment of one’s own army or the enemy army, as well as special sabotage equipment of industrial production. In addition, for sabotage, partisans use means of mechanical damage to objects, their arson, flooding, etc. The most preferable of all sabotage means are delayed-action mines (DAM) and radio-controlled mines (land mines).

When carrying out sabotage, as in general when conducting military operations, guerrillas must avoid templates, and demonstrate cunning and ingenuity. Here are just two examples of unconventional actions that led to significant successes. In the summer of 1937, Spanish guerrillas operating deep behind fascist lines managed to blow up a heavily guarded road bridge with a mine installed in a field kitchen that “accidentally” detached from an army truck.

In October 1943, Soviet partisans managed to blow up a railway bridge using a kind of “torpedo” – a motorized railcar loaded with explosives and stuffed German officers installed for camouflage.

DEPENDING on specific conditions, a partisan formation can be based in a specific territory or carry out continuous raids behind enemy lines.

Partisan basing can be organized in territory controlled by partisans, in territory controlled by the enemy, or in uncontrolled territory. To ensure the survivability of a partisan base, it is necessary to create a main base, 1-2 reserve bases, and 1-2 false bases.

The main base is a specially equipped area of ​​land where the partisans will be located for a long time. Here, dugouts for fighters, weapons and food warehouses, a hospital, shelters for vehicles and engineering structures for the defense of the base are built.

A reserve base is a pre-equipped area of ​​terrain where a partisan unit is redeployed if necessary. From the moment of transfer to a reserve base, it becomes the main one. There may be several reserve bases, but they must be equipped in exactly the same way as the main one. The exact location of reserve bases must be known only to the partisan command.

The creation of false bases is a necessary measure to mislead the enemy. Usually false bases are created in the same areas where the main and reserve bases are located – this increases the survivability of the latter.

Careful and timely organization of the protection and defense of the base area is of great importance for maintaining the combat capability of the partisan detachment. Therefore, it is advisable for each partisan formation to develop its own protection and defense plan, which defines the tasks, forces and means for this purpose, as well as specific methods of action during an attack.

Depending on the number of partisans, reconnaissance units in the form of patrols and groups are sent to distant approaches to the base (from 10 to 15 km); guard posts, posts or separate patrols, secrets and sentries operate on the near approaches (from 3 to 4 km). The guard guard must reliably cover all roads and paths and ensure all-round surveillance.

Direct security is organized at the most important objects, with special attention paid to the protection of the command, headquarters with communications equipment, warehouses and transport vehicles. Patrols and outposts must operate within the basing area itself. Various mine-explosive and wire barriers are also constructed.

At the same time, despite the most advanced fortifications, stationary bases cannot guarantee safety during a long stay in them – accordingly, the most expedient is to carry out raids on the enemy rear.

A raid is an organized movement of a partisan formation in previously reconnoitered areas, combined with the execution of specific combat missions – raids, ambushes and sabotage. It should be noted that raids require careful preparation and good material support.

During raids, the survivability of partisan units increases by 4-5 times, the area of ​​active partisan operations by 10-12 times, and the number of objects of influence by 6-8 times. This means that raids should be considered one of the active forms of partisan warfare not only in the past, but also in modern wars.

I. G. Starinov, in his lecture course “The Partisan Movement in the Great Patriotic War,” prepared by him in 1949 for the Frunze Academy, wrote about the raids of Soviet partisans as follows:

“The main objectives of the raids: development of the partisan movement in new areas; political work among the population; attacks on important objects in the enemy’s rear, mainly on communications; direct assistance to Soviet troops; escape from enemy attacks; reconnaissance and planting of agents; defeat of small enemy garrisons; destruction of traitors.

In the conditions of the last war, when the enemy had a huge fleet of vehicles, thousands of planes and tanks, Soviet partisans, relying on the population, skillfully using the terrain and time of year, carried out raids in large detachments and small groups over long distances behind enemy lines.

The first significant raids were carried out by Minsk partisans in the winter of 1941/42. A horse transport of 1,000 sleds was organized, small detachments were united and moved through the districts of the region. The raiding detachments destroyed German garrisons along the way and caused panic among the enemy. At first, the German command mistook the raiding detachments for units of the Red Army. The raids lasted 3-4 months.

In May-June 1942, Linkov’s detachment carried out a brilliant raid from the Lepel region to the Pinsk swamps, which had a great impact on strengthening the combat activities of the partisans and covering new areas with sabotage.

Raids from the Bryansk forests to Right-Bank Ukraine in the autumn and winter of 1942 were carried out by the units of Kovpak and Saburov. Subsequently, similar raids were carried out by other Ukrainian units.

A daring raid across the steppe belt of Ukraine was carried out by Naumov’s cavalry unit, numbering over 500 horsemen. It covered 2,396 km in 65 days. In 1943, Melnik’s unit carried out a raid in the difficult conditions of spring, autumn and winter.”

The largest number of raids was carried out by the unit of S. A. Kovpak. During the raid on the Carpathians, it derailed 19 trains, blew up 14 railway bridges with a length of 1,166 linear meters and 38 bridges on highways with a length of 2,369 meters, destroyed several different warehouses, including fuel and lubricants, and distributed more than 1,000 tons of food to the population.

During the raids from January 5 to August 18, 1944, the partisans under the command of P.P. Vershigora covered 4,150 km along the main route through Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR, destroyed 24 trains, 11 locomotives (not counting the effects of delayed-action mines), 227 cars; blew up 10 railway bridges and 61 highway bridges, 15 factories and 2 power plants; occupied the cities and towns of Gorokhov, Ciechanów, Tarnogród, Ulyanów, Krzyszów, Krasnobrud, Stanislavchik, Lopatin, Snów, Turets, Kamenka, Mosty; crossed the rivers Neman, Berezina, Shara, Svisloch, the Dnieper-Bug Canal, Goryn, Stokhid, and Western Bug.

In total, Kovpak’s detachments and units traveled more than 20,000 km along various routes behind enemy lines over 2 years.

A unique raid was carried out by Lieutenant Colonel Shukaev’s unit, which on July 20, 1943, with five groups totaling 52 people, was dropped into the forests 15 km north of Nizhyn, from where it passed through Western Ukraine and Poland to Czechoslovakia in the Poprad region and remained there until joining up with the Red Army. Shukaev’s unit grew quickly, its numbers sometimes reaching 2,800 people. Only along the route, this unit covered 4,860 km, and with operations up to 10,700 km. During the raid, the unit crossed 23 railways and 22 highways, carried out 832 sabotage operations and 194 crashes.

In preparation for raids, plans were developed for their stages and material support was prepared. A particularly detailed plan was needed for the first stage of a raid. The plan was compiled on the basis of the received task and covered the following issues: raid tasks; a detailed route of the first stage and an approximate route of the entire raid; intelligence and troop reconnaissance; political support; material support; medical support; combat operations in stages; sometimes – interaction with troops.

The raid plan was kept a closely guarded secret. Everyone knew they were going on a raid, but no one except the command knew where and how.

The greatest difficulties for significant partisan detachments were crossing water obstacles, roads and railways, especially when they were heavily guarded by the enemy. Thus, in the spring of 1943, Kovpak’s unit was unable to cross the Kalinkovichi-Gomel railway and was forced to change its route.

Organization and discipline, high morale, the correct choice of route taking into account all factors, including the attitude of the population, maintaining secrecy and misleading the enemy are the basis for success. Misleading the enemy was often facilitated by popular rumor, turning partisan detachments into regular units of the Red Army.

The partisans’ skillful use of sabotage equipment increased their combat capabilities hundreds of times, especially during raids.

Maneuver, speed of movement, overcoming swamps, forests and mountains, the ability to suddenly appear and disappear, actions in small groups, military cunning, skillful reconnaissance and counterintelligence are the basics of raiding party tactics. These are mandatory requirements when preparing parties for raids on large and important enemy targets, blowing up large railway bridges, combined raids on groups of bridges, simultaneous mass mining with the task of stopping traffic at a railway junction, raids on airfields, administrative centers, etc.

The main task of a raiding unit is to suddenly approach the target and strike, avoiding unnecessary battles that lead to an increase in the number of wounded and a decrease in the ability to maneuver.

Radio communication in raids is one of the main conditions for success. Providing detachments with radio equipment only for transmissions on the key over long distances (communication with the mainland) and the lack of radio equipment for communication between detachments via microphone significantly limited the maneuvering capabilities and operational efficiency of detachments.

The size of the raiding party depended on the mission, geographical conditions, and rear situation. Raids were carried out by groups of 5–8 people, and detachments, and united detachments of up to several thousand people. There were successful deep raids of small groups even in the south in treeless areas.

The column of a large detachment differed little from a marching column of rifle troops.

Movement outside the partisan area usually took place at night. The supply train, medical unit and artillery were in the center of the column. There were cases when the unit moved in several columns along parallel routes.

During the day, when enemy reconnaissance and combat aviation was in action, the movement of detachments outside of the vast forests was often impossible. Camouflaging themselves and taking up all-round defense, setting up ambushes and outposts, detachments rested during the day in groves, gullies, or populated areas far from the main highways. In winter, daytime rest was arranged mainly in populated areas.

The task of the outposts and ambushes, set up 4-6 km from the location of the unit, is to force the enemy to deploy as far as possible from the parking place, to find out the enemy’s strength, and to give the detachment the opportunity to take the necessary measures. The defense of large detachments is circular. When organizing the defense, the possibility of several options for leaving the place of rest for the day was taken into account.

The reserve was of great importance, in which up to 1/3 of the combat personnel was left. The purpose of the reserve was to break through the encirclement if the enemy managed to encircle the partisans.

Far from the location of the detachment, diversionary sabotage groups and reconnaissance usually operated.

Stopping for more than a day in one place was allowed if the enemy had not found the detachment or did not have sufficient forces for an attack.

Large detachments, when crossing railways and highways, set up screens and ambushes of varying strength on the sides, depending on the size of the detachment (unit) and the strength and resources of the expected enemy. Most often, this was a demolition team of machine gunners with several anti-tank rifles. Large units sometimes sent units with artillery.

Mines laid ahead of the outposts were widely used when crossing railways. When a train was blown up by a mine, the machine gunners of the screen sometimes finished off the manpower remaining after the crash, captured or destroyed the cargo being transported. Some commanders used double outposts for direct protection:

a) 1.5–2 km in both directions from the crossing point;

b) sabotage groups 3–5 km from the crossing, and sometimes to adjacent crossings, i.e. 10–15 km.

Double screens were used by raiding units when there were armored trains on a given road, which had to be blown up at such a distance that their artillery fire would not reach the place where the partisans were crossing the road.

Large units find it easier to carry out raids in winter than in summer. During the long winter night, partisans carried out normal marches of 40-50 km on sleds, and forced marches of 70-80 km. In winter, due to the short day, enemy aviation is of little use. Even when the enemy manages to establish reconnaissance and communications, he spends all daylight hours regrouping his forces, and at night the partisans are again elusive. With deep snow cover, the work of motor transport is difficult. Outposts and ambushes force the enemy to deploy 4-6 km from the detachment’s location. The partisans managed to organize a defense, delay the enemy until nightfall, and escape from the attack.

Here is another example of raids – this time by rebels. In the spring of 1958, Cuban guerrilla units under the command of Raul Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Ernest Che Guevara, having fought for several hundred kilometers, spread the rebellion throughout Cuba, which soon led to the fall of the Batista regime.

Based on the experience of the Cuban rebels, later summarized by Che Guevara, when preparing for raids, it is necessary to establish contacts with the underground in the areas through which the guerrillas will have to move, or to create it anew. It is necessary to conduct reconnaissance of the routes of movement in all possible directions. It is necessary to prepare weapons, equipment, transport and create reserves of food, ammunition, as well as fuel (if the guerrillas use motor transport) or forage (if using horses or other pack and riding animals). Such reserves must also be prepared on the routes of movement. To settle accounts with the local population, guerrilla detachments going on a raid must be supplied with money (or other means of payment).

In order to prevent information leaks, a range of counterintelligence measures are carried out during preparation for the raid, including active disinformation of the enemy.

During the movement, the partisans try to confuse the enemy as much as possible, trying to keep him in the dark about the true route of movement and the final goal of the raid. At present, to conceal the routes of movement and organize the protection of raiding partisan detachments, such methods as sabotage using mines or incendiary devices of delayed action, installed with a long delay, disabling wire communication lines, jamming the working frequencies of enemy radio stations, using regular buses, freight and passenger trains for movement, etc. can be used. In all populated areas located on the route, the partisans try to work closely with the population as much as possible, implementing the set of measures described above. In addition to creating a partisan infrastructure, this allows for the compensation of losses incurred during the raid at the expense of volunteers.

In areas where the partisans will immediately receive significant support from the population, a group of organizers may remain, supplied with everything necessary, while the main detachment moves on, until returning to the support base or until reaching the final destination of the route (a newly created partisan region or support base).

Autore: Oleg Ryazanov

Fonte: Bratishka. 2008. No. 1-3 (MILITERA)