Combined Arms Theory and Practice in the 20th Century

Part 1: England: “Hurry up and proceed with caution!”

In 1918, the British Empire was the world leader in both the development of armored equipment and tactics. The attitude prevalent at the time in most armies was still that the tank was a specialized infantry-support weapon useful in crossing entrenchments but not much else. However, there were a number of visionaries in the Royal Tank Corps who saw a much broader role for mechanized organizations. By May of 1918, Col. J.F.C. Fuller had adapted the “Stoss” tactics of the Germans, which had caused so much consternation on the Western Front a short time earlier, into his “Plan 1919”.

“Plan 1919” was a complicated and multi-faceted proposal for a large-scale armored offensive that would produce multiple penetrations of the German defenses and then go on to disrupt the German command structure and rear-area support system. Fuller described the goal of this offensive as “…to defeat the enemy by a pistol shot to the brain”. Rather than defeat the enemy’s combat elements by systematic attrition and forcing him back onto his own defenses and support (strengthening him in the process), Fuller planned to attack enemy headquarters, support, and supply elements before they could displace to safety.

There were two problems with Fuller’s concept:

1. This deep penetration of the German defenses required the use of the new Medium Tank Type “D” which was designed to do twenty miles per hour. Once the heavy’s breached the German lines, the “D”‘s would rush forward and create havoc in the German rear. Teething problems with the “D” were severe and, in fact, it was unlikely that it would be ready in time for the 1919 offensive.

2. Fuller was noteworthy for his cavalier (pun intended) attitude toward infantry-tank cooperation. He conceived of truck-borne infantry following along in the wake of his tank “Fleet”, but never envisaged close cooperation except at the outset in a set-piece engagement.

Despite the efforts of Fuller and others, the British army gradually lost its lead not only in tank warfare but in most areas of tactical progress. In the “Introduction” I listed six common factors which prevented innovation overall. In addition to these there were several obstacles peculiar to the British.

The most commonly cited was “Traditionalism”. But, though important, institutional resistance to progress is often exagerrated. Though the strong “Unit Identity” engendered by the British regimental system discouraged any truly radical changes. To this must be added the fact that Britain was the first nation to create an independent air force. The RAF, intent on developing its own identity, resisted the whole idea of close cooperation with the ground forces. Like every other air force, the RAF was in love with interdiction and strategic bombing and, as I said in the introduction, ground support was considered too costly in planes and pilots, and the targets unimportant relative to that risk. British army regulation of 1924 states the case clearly. “…the RAF will provide liaison and reconnaissance in the immediate proximity of ground units…Fighter aircrft may conduct strafing and other ground attacks (in exceptional circumstances).” Close air-support did not develop in the RAF until 1942.

Imperial Defense

There was also the problem of “Imperial Defense”. Put simply, Britain had a huge empire to control with limited manpower and financial resources. Units were routinely rotated overseas, especially to provide regular garrisons for the Middle East and India. It would be wasteful to “mechanize” a formation stationed in England, only to see that unit shipped of to “the Khyber” where endless patrolling and small unit “skirmishes” were the rule. Not only did this delay mechanization, but it adversely effected vehicle design in that British engineers had to think about the pressing requirement for weapons for use in “low intensity” warfare against unsophisticated “tribal” forces in areas where firepower and armor were far less important than cost and ease of maintenance.

This is not to say that Britain stood still in the 20’s. Remember that a repitition of the trench warfare of WWI was not expected to happen. British thinking returned to the concepts of a mobile “war of maneuver” as before 1914. Of course, these concepts would be updated to allow for the effects of firepower and motor transport. Returning to the 1924 regulations: “…Infantry support is the chief mission of tanks.” But provision was also made for tank flank attacks and raids on vulnerable enemy rear installations, ala J.F.C. Fuller.

I’m going to stop here and digress. I can’t help visualizing these rear area raids. Long columns of tanks careening around in enemy territory while the RAF, with no common communications link and no ground support liaison, flies over the same territory, hungrily seeking long “enemy” columns to devastate as part of their “interdiction” policy. Not pretty!

These regulations showed a serious concern for anti-tank and anti-air defense of all arms. The actual weapons, however, were slow to appear. By 1929 the old belief in the primacy of infantry had finally been replaced by a new doctrine of close cooperation of all arms. The problem with this lay in the implementation of the doctrine. Close cooperation was to be achieved by detailed, meticulous planning as in 1918! Coordination of all arms in the maelstrom of an encounter battle was never considered.

In spite of financial difficulties, Britain managed to motorize certain artillery and supply units to support the Royal Tank Corps. They were then able to conduct brigade-level exercises in 1927-28 which included a light tank-armed reconnaissance battalion, a medium-tank “assault” battalion, a motorized MG battalion, five mobile artillery batteries (wheeled and tracked), and a motorized engineer company. The conclusions drawn from this experiment were unfortunate. Because of the wide disparity in cross country mobility between the various units, proper cooperation was only possible at very slow speeds. Therefore the Royal Tank Corps went on to focus on nearly pure, tanks-only formations in its 1929 regulation: “Mechanized and Armoured Formations” by Col. Charles Broad.

Proposed Tank Corp

The proposed Royal Tank Corps would have tanks, mechanized infantry, and mechanized cavalry;(?) but no artillery or engineers. The “mixed” tank companies would have three different vehicles! Seven light tanks for recon and fire support, five mediums for the actual assault, and two “close support” tanks (self propelled howitzers) to provide smoke and suppressive fire. The idea of an armoured personnel carrier was debated by Liddell Hart, Broad, and Fuller. The latter two demanded pure tank forces primarily because of the aforementioned difficulty in cooperating at anything like practical speed. G.L. Martel, a real innovator, came up with the idea of extremely small APC’s capable of carrying one to three men and a machinegun for infantry support. These vehicles were tried in both that role and as recon vehicles and were inadequate for either. When the “Universal Carrier” or “Bren Carrier” finally arrived on the eve of WWII, it was still dispersed in small numbers in “foot” mobile infantry battalions.

In 1934, experiments progressed to a “Division” scale exercise. It was a disaster, riddled with personality clashes, lack of training, and artificial restrictions on the part of the umpires. General Lindsay, the exercise’s biggest supporter was completely discredited and lost all future influence over policy!

The result of this fiasco was the formation of a permanent “Mobile” division consisting of two armored cavalry brigades in light tanks and armored cars, one tank brigade, 2 mechanized infantry brigades, and limited artillery, engineer, and service support. The main problem? Recon, medium tanks, infantry, and artillery were in separate brigade commands! There were two of these formations. 1st armoured Division, which left its equipment and many of its men in France, and another set up in Egypt which became the basis for later operations there. Aside from organization, there were also problems with equipment. There was practically no change in the basic British designs from 1922 to 1938! The biggest change came in 1932 with a quantum leap in radio technology. Up to that time each crew had to tune their vehicle’s radio by hand to a common frequency. Bouncing along cross-country tended to throw this off with resultant chaos. Proper “crystal” sets with preset frequencies changed all that. However, the cost of this innovation was prohibitive and wide distribution was very slow.

There was also the confusion about tank “roles” which thwarted good vehicle design while debate raged. This resulted in two basic types of tank: fast ones and heavily armored ones. The fast tanks were advocated by the tank purists of the cavalry school. The slow, heavy ones were backed by the infantry support school which required tanks to be able to operate in an “anti-tank gun rich” environment at slow speeds. The real loser in this debate was firepower.

Early tank armor was vulnerable to heavy machineguns or cannon of as little as 20mm caliber. This became the standard caliber for quite some time. Anticipating improvements, however, Britain standardized the 40mm (2 lbr) as both their towed and tank mounted anti-tank weapon. This could stand up to German armor between 1939 and 1942 but after that it was practically useless. The 57mm (6 lbr) was called for as early as 1938 (There’s a what-If for you!) but was not a requirement until after the fall of France. Even then, many turrets designed for the 2 lbr were too small to be upgraded.

Final Analysis

In the final analysis, the British army of 1939 possessed an infantry squad centered around the excellent “Bren” light machinegun. The platoon added the 2″ mortar and the “Boyes” anti-tank rifle. The battalion then added Bren guns in armored carriers, 2 lbr ATG’s, 3″ mortars and AAMG’s. The result was that the infantry was much lighter and more mobile than it had been but with reduced firepower and limited anti-tank capability. The latter forced the Royal Artillery to bear the burden of anti-tank defense. Although they developed pieces with a good AT ability and adequate tactics, they necessarily neglected the intricate skills required for successful indirect fire developed during WWI. Things actually went so far that British organization briefly eliminated indirect-fire survey parties from artillery headquarters!

Britain had lost much of its pioneering advantage. Outside of the infantry battalion, cooperation between different weapons systems was little better than it had been in 1914.

Part 2: Germany: “Smash them! Don’t tickle them!”

I’ve shown how the victors of WWI had a natural tendency to employ at least some of the material and doctrine of 1918 during the immediate post war period. Germany, the defeated power, had every reason to seek new and innovative tactics and weapons.

Even had they wished to do so, the Germans would have found it impossible to recreate the mass army and costly static defenses of 1914-18. The German army was limited to 100,000 long-term professional soldiers (with no reserves except for paramilitary police) by the treaty of Versailles. This same treaty also forbade tanks, poison gas, combat aircraft, and even heavy artillery!

Designed to cripple any future German war effort, these prohibitions may have been a blessing in disguise. German military thought was forced to be less restricted. Having no stockpiled weapons left over from 1918, German planners could study fresh ideas and develop weapons to’ test these ideas. Evolving doctrine dictated technical development, which was the antithesis of the policies of the victorious armies. To conduct field trials, the Germans used mock-ups, or tested equipment and theory in secret within the Soviet Union.

I’m not saying the Germans started from scratch. No army can completely escape its past. But when it came to innovation, the Germans had a real advantage over their future enemies (who also happened to be their past enemies).

Traditional German tactics, going all the way back to the 1860’s, favored flank attacks and encircling movements. Failing this, they favored “breakthroughs” which disrupted enemy organization and rear area support facilities. This led to two practices:

1. The Germans concentrated their resources on a fairly narrow front to achieve “breakthrough”, unlike the French or British who learned to attack on a broad front to protect their flanks.

2. Such concentrations required detailed planning and integration of all weapons and arms “at battalion level or lower” to overwhelm local defenses. The infiltration (Stoss) tactics of 1917-18 reflected this view and were retained after the armistice.

Therefore, in spite of the Versailles restrictions, 1921 German field regulations concerning “Command and Combat of the Combined Arms” included the “Infantry Assault Battalions” and and the meticulous “Artillery Preparation” of 1918, but also “Close Air Support”, “Poison Gas”, and “Infantry Tank Support”. Here, then, is an example ofthe German freedom to develop doctrine based on experience, without the restrictions of existing technology. These sophisticated regulations remained the key to German doctrine throughout the inter-war period.

Then there was the German tradition of “decentralized execution.” German commanders traditionally moved about in the forward areas, assessing conditions and making tactical decisions based on their direct observations and conversations with small unit commanders “in the line.” This enabled them to make their decisions clear to their subordinates and produce orders which reflected the “actual” tactical situation.

The speed at which orders could be implemented was also enhanced by the greater mutual understanding among German unit leaders. To this was added the efficiency of a common and clearly articulated doctrine as defined in “Command and Combat of the Combined Arms”. Knowledge of the both the commander’s intentions and the common doctrine reduced the need for detailed orders from above. The resultant flexability led to rapidity of decision and implementation ideally suited to fluid combat, i.e. mechanized operations.

Recap

To recap, we have seen the German experience with the psychological effects of tanks in WWI, Stoss tactics, massing on a narrow front, and decentralized execution. It would seem these factors would inevitably lead to “Blitzkrieg”. Wrong!

Wholehearted acceptance of blitzkrieg did not occur until after the fall of France in 1940. Prior to that, the majority of senior German officers thought of mechanization as “useful” but too specialized a tool to replace ordinary infantry divisions. Once more the “traditional” viewpoint went down hard and slowly, just as in Britain, France, and elsewhere.

The most influential proponent of the blitzkrieg was Gen. Heinz Guderian. Guderian had considerable experience with the early use of radios in combat. He had served with radiotelegraph units supporting cavalry operations. The result was his insistence on radios in every German armored vehicle, in direct contrast to the French and early British where radios were limited to command vehicles. These armies considered hand signals and flags to be adequate for inter-tank communication in the heat of battle!

Generally, Guderian’s early service taught him how hard it could be to integrate new doctrine and equipment and overcome institutional resistance to anything new. His staff work was concerned primarily with motorized transport.

The small size of the German army in the 1920’s forced a dependence on mobility to shift limited forces rapidly from place to place. Oddly enough, it was British experience the Germans relied upon to learn about equipment they themselves did not possess themselves in large numbers. But their conclusions were developed independently from British trends. As seen in part one, the British were tending towards pure armor formations. Guderian discounted the usefulness of separate tank formations or even the mechanization of parts of the traditional arms. What he foresaw was an entirely new mechanized formation of all arms that would maximize the effectiveness of the tank. Only fully mechanized formations could sustain fully mobile warfare.

Guderian was not deterred by the general belief that antitank weapons had become too strong for tanks to overcome. He simply integrated anti-tank weapons into the mechanized combined- arms team. Early tanks were generally too small and unstable to carry effective highvelocity anti-tank guns, and existing anti-tank artillery had greater range, a higher rate of fire, and greater ease of concealment than tanks, making them difficult to engage.

German tankers were trained to avoid fighting enemy tanks or antitank guns and instead to exploit areas of little resistance. When they did encounter enemy armor, their doctrine was to fall back behind a screen of anti-tank guns deployed behind their spearheads and allow them to engage that armor from concealed positions.

This doctrine required mobile supporting arms, including large, well armed and organized reconnaissance units, both to lead the way and to protect the flanks of the advance and combat engineers to sustain mobility, Motorized and mechanized infantry and artillery were needed to reduce bypassed centers of resistance, support the tanks in the attack, and hold the ground taken. The whole force then required a supply and maintenance “tail” capable of keeping up with the advance as well.

The implementation of this policy was not without opposition and difficulty, however. The other branches of the German armed forces weren’t going to take the formation of an entirely new arm lying down and demanded their share of motorization and mechanization. In the late 1930’s the General Staff directed the motorization of all anti-tank units and one engineer company in every infantry division, as well as the complete motorization of four infantry divisions. In 1937-38 two independent tank brigades were formed solely for infantry support.

Then the cavalry formed four “light” divisions. These consisted generally of an armored recon regiment, two motor infantry regiments, one light tank battalion, and two towed howitzer battalions. This drain on resources frustrated Guderian’s efforts and diluted his authority as he had no control over the motorized infantry or light divisions.

In addition, German tanks weren’t up to the standard necessary for blitzkrieg. – Hitler’s first priority in R&D during most of his regime was the Luftwaffe. This was due primarily to the intimidation value it gave him in dealing with other European politicians. Guderian, therefore, had to settle for tanks that were not entirely battleworthy.

The Pz I was basically a machinegun carrier, and the Pz 11 had little armor protection. These two vehicles made up the bulk of German armor units until after the battle for France in 1940. Their value lay in their being available in large numbers (with radios) early enough to allow extensive training exercises. These exercises led to the establishment of battle procedures to identify and solve problems, and to develop workable organizations and mobile support practices.

The panzer divisions were not completely ready in 1939, but they had gone through the first stages of organization and training. They were pretty much alone in this.

Close Air Support

Finally, there was the advantage of close air support of ground troops. Initially the Luftwaffe favored strategic bombing and air-superiority like other nations’ air arms, and close support was neglected. It was the Spanish Civil War that changed these priorities to some extent. German forces aiding Franco had used a limited number of obsolete fighters in a ground attack role with considerable effect. By the fall of 1938 there were five German ground-attack aviation groups. Ernst Udet persuaded his superiors to produce a few close- support dive-bombers based on the U.S. Navy’s Curtiss Helldiver. The result was the JU-87 “Stuka”.

The Stuka proved both accurate and demoralizing to ground troops. In addition, a small number of air-liaison detachments were added to infantry corps and Panzer division HQ’s in the main attack. These could pass requests for airsupport on to the Luftwaffe and monitor air recon reports. They could not guide aircraft onto targets and were not trained to do so. Generally requests for air support had to be submitted in advance and the call might or might not be honored! In 1939, on-call air support was in the future.

The tradition of combined arms integration was continued and updated in the German army between the wars. Guderian’s primary failure was his denial of the need to provide armor and motorized equipment for the mass of the army, which remained essentially dependent on human and horse feet for mobility. His primary success was to keep the majority of Germany’s mechanized assets concentrated in combined arms units instead of being spread in small pockets throughout the army, where whatever good effect they might have would be diluted to insignificance.

In September of 1939, twenty-four of thirty-three tank battalions and almost 2,000 of the 3,000 tanks available were concentrated in six panzer divisions. The contrast with other countries, where large numbers of tanks were spread out in infantry-support and cavalry roles, is striking!

Part 3: Soviet Russia: “Deep Battle!”

Before I begin this segment, I would like to recognize the assistance of Charles Sharp. Although he didn’t have anything to do with the writing Of it, I’ve been picking his brains for twenty-five years. Much of what I’ve learned about the Soviet Army had its beginnings in long conversations over beer at game cons etc. for a good deal of those two-and-ahalf decades.

Military development in the Soviet Union took a different path from the rest of Europe. There were two reasons for this. First, the Red Army wasn’t created until 1918, ‘aftero the Bolshevik revolution. It therefore lacked the traditions and training of other major armies. Many of its commanders had been NCO’s or junior officers in WWI. Few senior Tsarist officers remained with the new regime, and those who did were generally suspected of anti- Bolshevik sympathies. This resulted in a Red Army open to innovation, unhampered by excessive tradition or established doctrines. It also allowed for serious blunders based simply on the ignorance of inexperience.

Second, the Russian Civil War (1918-1921) was remarkably different from most of the European campaigns in WWI. Under-strength armies fought over vast distances. Penetration and encirclement were comparatively easy. Fluid maneuver became the rule rather than the exception. Partly because of this, the elite Soviet force was Marshal Budenny’s 1st Cavalry Army, famed for the sort of encirclement and pursuit battles that these conditions dictated. This veteran force also had a patron: Joseph Stalin! Stalin had been commissar of the next higher headquarters to this army. As a result, many of its officers rose to senior positions both before and during WWII.

Like Germany, but unlike France and Britain, the Soviet Union was openly interested in offensive warfare. Part of the policy of international Communism in its early years was the spread of its philosophy through wars of “National Liberation’ (Conquest) throughout Europe. As a matter of practicality, Stalin chose to concentrate on developing the Soviet Union before expanding into the rest of Europe.

The Red Army, however, could still expect any future war to be offensive in nature. This orientation was further reinforced by the close relationship that existed between the Red Army and the German Army that existed between 1923 and 1932. Soviet officers studied in Germany, while the Germans secretly manufactured and tested tanks, aircraft, and poison gas in European Russia. This is not to say that Soviet doctrine was dependent in any way on similar developments in Germany. Soviet concepts became official state policy long before Guderian gained even partial recognition and approval from his government.

During the 1920’s and early 1930’s, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and a group of like-minded Soviet officers developed a concept called “Deep Battle”. This employed conventional infantry and cavalry divisions, mechanized formations, and aviation units in concert. The result was the “Field Regulations” of 1936. The infantry was no longer to be the premier combat arm. “Deep Battle” envisioned all available arms and weapons systems working together in a two-part battle.

In the first phase a massed echeloned attack on a narrow front would rupture the defender’s conventional infantry-artillery-anti-tank defense. The attacker’s artillery and mortars would suppress defending artillery and especially antitank weapons. Moving behind the artillery barrage and a few meters in front of the infantry, the tanks would safely crush barbed wire, overrun machinegun posts, and reduce centers of enemy resistance. Once the enemy’s forward defenses were disrupted, accompanying tanks would not be tied strictly to the infantry’s rate of advance, but could take advantage of opportunities to attack enemy reserves, artillery positions, headquarters and supply dumps.

The ensuing chaos would signal the onset of the second phase. “Mobile Groups”, composed of cavalry, mechanized formations or both, would exploit their mobility to outflank the enemy or develop any penetration in order to reach deep into the enemy rear. The idea was to attack the full depth of the enemy defenses simultaneously, with conventional frontal attacks, long range artillery fire and tactical air attacks, deep penetrations by mobile forces, and bombing and parachute attacks on key points. Smoke screens, diversionary attacks, deliberate misinformation, and other deception operations would distract the enemy from the true objective.

This doctrine was remarkably sophisticated and difficult to implement, but the necessary force structure was well on its way to completion by 1937. Using the expanded production facilities of the Soviet’s first Five Year Plan with design features taken, in part, from the American inventor J. Walter Christie, the Soviets produced 5,000 armored vehicles by 1934. This figure comes from “The Creation and Development of Tank Troop Tactics in the Pre-War Period” (A. Ryazanskiy 1966), and independent sources verify this figure.

This wealth of equipment enabled the Red Army to create tank organizations for both infantry support and combined arms- mechanized operations. Virtually all rifle divisions had a tank company, or even a full battalion, attached to them, with a full regiment (approx. 190 tanks) in each horse cavalry division. It was as early as 1930 that the Red Army began the experiment with integrating all arms into functional mechanized groups at the battalion and brigade levels (and sometimes even higher).

Organization changed rapidly with the evolution of equipment and techniques and it would take an enormous amount of space to illustrate these. The four “mechanized” corps of 1935 were actually small, armored divisions. They were almost all tanks. By the end of the 1930’s, the “Tank Corps” was increasingly large and “tank heavy”, but still integrated essential combat arms at a relatively low level.

Problems

But there were problems! Soviet doctrine was so ambitious that not all units could be fully equipped. This meant that real integration of all weapons in training and true standardization of tactics was impossible. The average Soviet citizen had little or no experience with motor vehicles. This meant maintenance was always a problem. Soviet radios proved to be notoriously unreliable. This made cohesive movement and control of this mass of moving vehicles a command nightmare. The Soviets spared no effort in scheduling major exercises throughout the 1930’s, but they still needed several more years of experimentation and training before the full potential of their doctrine could be realized. Time ran out!

On June 12th, 1937, Tukhachevsky and eight of his top-ranking assistants were executed. Over the next four years over 20% of the Soviet officer corps were either imprisoned or themselves executed in the greatest massacre of an army by its own government to ever occur. This included the majority of commanders at regimental and higher levels.

Thus, at the same time the Red Army was expanding to meet the threat from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, it lost its most experienced planners and leaders. The “Peter” principle took effect as the politically reliable survivors were promoted beyond their capacity, with disastrous results on unit development and tactics.

At this same time, Soviet experience in the Spanish Civil War caused further reassessments in mechanization theory. D. Pavlov, chief of tank troops, had served in Spain. He came back pessimistic. Soviet tanks were too lightly armored, and in combat they tended to leave the infantry and artillery behind. Pavlov believed the new mechanized formations were too unwieldy, and would have a hard time penetrating enemy defense in order to conduct “Deep Battle”. Pavlov’s conclusions were based on the use of fifty tanks at the battle of Esquivas with no chance of surprise. This didn’t seem to prevent him from generalizing from his experience!

In his defense, many observers from other armies reached the same conclusions based on the same limited experience.

Pavlov’s reports were partially responsible for a review of tank force organization by Gen. Kulik in 1939. There were few advocates for large, mechanized formations – they were dead or in prison! The commission directed the partial dismantling of such units, and a re- emphasis of direct infantry support. A bright spot in all this was the emergence of the new “Motorized” division of 1939, which may have been a response to German armored success in Poland and the Soviet success against the Japanese in that same year. Fifteen motorized divisions were planned, with the first four created by 1940. They represented a more well-rounded organization than the tank corps they replaced.

Shambles

In spite of this reorganization, the Red Army was a shambles. It failed to occupy a defeated Poland effectively in 1939, and failed to rapidly defeat Finland in 1939-40. These failures prompted further reforms. All this was combined with the success of the Far Eastern Army, which was the last to feel the effects of the Stalin purge. The training and command structure of this army was still intact when hostilities against the Japanese erupted in the summer of 1939. To the utter surprise of the Japanese, the Soviets were able to mass 469 light tanks, 426 other AFVs, 679 guns and mortars and over 500 aircraft far from the nearest railway. They accomplished this using a shuttle system that brought together thousands of trucks to bring supplies over terrain the Japanese considered impassible to wheeled transport.

This Soviet force, under G. Zhukov, out-maneuvered, out- thought, and, in the end, out-fought the Japanese using probing attacks- to locate strongpoints, artillery and airpower concentrations to reduce them, and flanking maneuvers to unhinge the Japanese line and inflict a serious drubbing on them. The doctrine of “Deep Battle” had been vindicated and would prove its worth later in the struggle to expel the Nazis from Soviet soil.

Part IV: USA “Some of This, Some of That”

In 1918 the U.S. Army’s division structure contained 12 infantry battalions and 9 Artillery battalions which made it the largest and most powerful infantry division in the war (at 28,000+ men), and very different from that of all other combatants, whose priority was to spread their diminishing manpower pool as far as they could. In spite of this considerable difference in structure, the U.S. Army was heavily under the influence of French staff and tactical doctrine. This is logical since the Americans had to learn to do business in a manner compatible with the French units they fought alongside daily. As a result of this, immediate postwar doctrine in the U.S. Army paralleled that of the French Army. Tank forces were subordinated to the infantry branch.

Initial postwar regulations reflected the French view of combined arms so faithfully that the 1923 “Provisional Manual of Tactics for Large Units” didn’t even bother to mention that it was a direct translation of the 1921 French “Provisional Instructions”. The same year the U.S. revised its “Field Service Regulations,” which insisted that “no one arm wins battles. The combined employment of all arms is essential to success.” In the next paragraph, however, it stated that the mission of the entire force “is that of the infantry.” You have to admit this is a pretty rigid view of the “Combined Arms” doctrine!

It didn’t affect all American military men, nor did it last for any appreciable length of time. As early as 1920, staff officers such as Brig. Gen. Fox Conner decided that trench warfare was inappropriate for operations in North America, which was the expected arena of future American warsl Conner asked Gen. John J. Pershing, the U.S. wartime commander in France, to discard the “square” division structure above as too immobile and unwieldy for future requirements. Pershing’s answer was to reorganize the U.S. infantry division along the lines of the European “triangular” divisions. Specialized units which would only be required from time to time would be pooled at the level of Corps and Field Army. When the army attempted to apply the principles of this reorganization, it was found that a comprehensive review of the most fundamental relationships between the various combat arms and services was required.

A number of boards were organized to review the American experience in WWI. These recommended slight changes in the “square” division’s organization during the 1920’s. By 1925, U.S. Officer education focused on mobile warfare, with trench warfare relegated to the status of a 1. special operation.” But financial restrictions and general governmental neglect prevented major reforms in organization or improvements in equipment until the mid 1930’s.

At this time the “New Deal” released public works funds to the army to jumpstart the depression-gutted U.S. economy. These funds were used to purchase vehicles for the partial motorization of active duty and National Guard divisions, and the production of improved carriages with pneumatic tires for existing artillery weapons. This was important because, without pneumatic tires, guns could not be towed at the high speed of which motor transport was capable.

In 1935, Gen. Malin Craig became Army Chief of Staff. Craig listened to Conner and the other reformers and instigated a review of all combat organization and tactics. He specifically suggested that the old “square” division be replaced with a smaller, more mobile one using mechanical power to replace muscle power wherever possible.

The proposed new division totaled only 13,552 men and much more closely resembled European “triangular” divisions existent at the time. From 1936-1939 it was the 2nd Infantry Division which had the honor of conducting extensive tests of the new concepts involved including such things as:

1. Firepower and frontage allocated per man and per unit.
2. The proportion of artillery and transport allocated for support.
3. At what level should weapons be pooled? (Plt, Co, etc.)

The driving force behind the tests was Brig. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, the same man who later designed and trained the Army Ground Forces of World War II.

McNair’s organization was quite similar to the theoretical organization proposed by Pershing and Conner in 1920. Machineguns and other specialized heavy weapons were integrated into the infantry rifle organization at every level, and the system was to be triangular! Each commander had a headquarters and “three” subordinate rifle (maneuver) units, plus a weapons unit. Three rifle platoons + weapons platoon per company, three companies + weapons company per battalion etc. There was tactical flexibility in that commanders might shift companies between battalions or battalions between regiments, but, by doctrine, all units operated with three subordinate maneuver units.

Each echelon also had a combination of flat-trajectory and high-angle weapons. There was a flaw in this new organization, however. The emphasis was on “mobility” over firepower. The U.S. platoon had nothing heavier than the BAR (a poor substitute for a true machinegun), which was only slightly mitigated by the rapid fire ability of the M1 Garand, and the company had nothing heavier than the 60mm mortar. Since U. S. tactics were based on the establishment of a base of fire and the maneuvering of a light force in conjunction with that base, this organization left U.S. infantry at a disadvantage.

The “pooling” principle continued throughout the division. Light AT guns, 81mm mortars, and machineguns went to the heavy weapons company of the battalion. Specialized arms such as tanks, AA guns, and most AT guns were ‘not’ authorized within the division, because McNair believed these weapons should be held in a central mass to be deployed decisively and not dispersed. Also the division got only one ‘recon’ troop. Long range recon was to be provided by higher echelons.

The result was a unit that was more mobile and heavily armed than before, yet seriously deficient compared to most foreign armies. Its principal weakness, in addition to insufficient automatic weapons, was its limited capacity for AA and AT defense. The effects of “Blitzkrieg” forced the army to realize that it had better strengthen both these arms.

The controversies over the triangular division included how much artillery support would be needed (originally three mixed 75mm gun/81mm mortar bns and one 105mm howitzer bn!) and how many engineers (if any!).

The June, 1941 organization represented the final phase prior to the American entry into the war:

1 x Division HQ & MP Company
1 x Armored Cavalry Troop (Company)
1 x Engineer Battalion
3 x Infantry Regts @ 3x Infantry Bns,
1xATG Co(37mm),
1 xHQ&SVC Co
1 x Artillery Regt @ 1 xHHB,
3xArty Bn @ 3x105mm Btty,
1x37mm ATG Co
1 x Heavy Arty Bn @ 3x 155mm Btty,
1xMxd ATG Co (37mm/75mm)
1 xHHB

for a total of 9 infantry bns, 60 37mm ATG, 8 75mm ATG, 36 105mm howitzer, and 12 155mm howitzer.

The most important factor in the increase of real combat power in the new division came from developments at the Army Field Artillery School. There the problem of massing fires on targets of opportunity was being revolutionized by a series of dedicated and brilliant veteran/ instructors.

During WWI, massed fires were normally set up in carefully planned concentrations, where previously established targets were pinpointed on maps and overlays. If some new target presented itself, it was difficult to bring more than one battery to bear on it. The reasons are a bit complex, so bear with me. A battery forward observer had to both be able to see the target and communicate with his battery. This meant he had to keep in telephone contact through vulnerable land lines. You can imagine how tough it would be to keep this line open and advance with the infantry being supported.

Some forward observers did mange it from time to time, (for which they were probably decorated!) but even if they did, there was no way they could guide other batteries to any new target, unless its map location had previously been ‘precisely’ established. However, by 1941 a means of concentrating any amount of artillery fire on a given target of opportunity had been developed.

Step one was to provide new and more reliable radios to largely replace field telephones in fluid situations. The second step was procedural. The impact of artillery shells and adjustments to them had always been recorded on firing charts oriented from the point of view of the battery location. All these calculations would now be recorded from the F.0’s point of view!

Firing tables compensated for differences in location for various batteries, and one artillery weapon (known to us gun-grapes as the ‘base piece’) in each battalion was surveyed in relation to a common reference point for all guns in that divisional area. (You’ll excuse me if I get excited about this. I cut my Marine Corps teeth in 11th Marines as a gun- gorilla on O-Fives and FiveFives!)

The result of this was that FDC’s (Fire Direction Centers) could now provide one infantry unit with a whole battalion, or a whole regiment, or even more, of supporting artillery which could be controlled by only one observerl By contrast, throughout WWII, German artillerymen had to use well-known terrain features to adjust on a target of opportunity; massing fires remained extremely difficult. The new FDC’s gave the U. S. a previously impossible degree of infantry-artillery integration. It also encouraged the U.S. to maintain large amounts of non-divisional artillery to be parceled out as needed.

When it came to the development of armored and mechanized forces, the U.S. wasn’t so advanced. We were saddled with a tank inventory of left over WW I tanks models and a doctrine of subordination of the tank arm to direct infantry support. Luckily, the British experiments of the late 1920s, combined with the efforts of a certain persistent cavalry officer named Adna Chaffee Jr., led to a series of limited steps in the mechanization of U.S. Forces.

The Tank School at Fort Meade Maryland formed the (EAF) Experimental Tank Force in 1928 – 1929. It consisted of two battalions of obsolescent tanks, one of truck-borne infantry, an armored car troop, and small elements of engineers, signals, medical, ammunition, chemical warfare, and maintenance troops.

The force suffered frequent breakdowns, but the experiments aroused enough interest for a more permanent force to be established at Fort Eustis in 1930. The unit was disbanded after only one year due to lack of funds (‘The Great Depression’, remember?). It was absorbed by the Fort Benning Infantry School as “The Tank School” along with the remaining tank units.

During his tenure as Army Chief of Staff from 1930-1935, Douglas MacArthur was an advocate of motorization and mechanization throughout the army. The budget in those days made this impossible, but Chaffee persuaded him to conduct limited experiments with cavalry units. This was in their own best interest since the mounted arm’s whole existence was at stake during the inter-war period. In the U.S., tanks were part of the infantry branch ‘by law’ so the cavalry simply called their tanks ‘combat cars’ (virtually the same models as the infantry’s tanks). In 1932 a one-squadron cavalry regiment moved to Camp Knox, Kentucky, followed by another in 1936. These became the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized).

This force had the same weaknesses as European mechanized cavalry. It was too lightly armed and armored and considered useful only for raiding and pursuit. No matter how hard Chaffee tried he could only get the other arms to train with his brigade periodically. It wasn’t until January, 1940 that the brigade was authorized an engineer troop, and at about the same time received an infantry regiment (the 6th). Also a “Provisional Tank Brigade” was formed out of various units at Fort Benning. Then everything hit the fan in May 1940!

The U.S. Army was now hot to make real progress in the development of mechanization. To avoid branch prejudice, Chaffee convinced the War Department to create an independent “Armored Force” as an arm in its own right. In July 1940 the 7th Cavalry Brigade and the Provisional Tank brigade became the nuclei of the first two U.S. armored divisions.

Like everyone else’s early armored divisions, these were very tankheavy. Each possessed 6 light and 2 medium battalions of about 400 tanks in all, with only two battalions of armored infantry and three of artillery. There weren’t enough infantry to support the tanks and the majority of the tanks were too light to stand up to the heavier German models. Obviously, more development and mass production were required.

Lastly, close air support was lacking in the U.S. combat team. In spite of the efforts of a few aviators such as Frank Lackland, the U.S. was preoccupied with strategic bombing to the neglect of close air support. This view overlooked certain vital aspects of ground combat: the psychological impact of close air attack, the principle of “Mass’ which states that all resources must be concentrated to overcome the inherent advantages of the defense in modern war, and the need to achieve this concentration rapidly enough to prevent the defender from reorganizing and concentrating his own forces and therefore sustain mobility.

All three of these aspects argue for close air support at the critical point, but in 1939 only the Luftwaffe had made even limited preparations to provide it.

Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, the U. S. was an interested observer of WW II. Most of the U.S. Army didn’t become involved in the war until the end of 1942 or later. During the ‘Neutral Period’, however, the U.S. drew certain conclusions about weapons, organization, and tactics, and continued the evolution of its triangular infantry division and the 1940 armored division. Maneuvers held in the U.S. and initial combat experiences overseas forced certain changes in American doctrine. The resulting system was to dominate our military well into the 1950’s.

In March 1942, Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair, (remember him?) one of the designers of the triangular division in the 1930’s, became head of Army Ground Forces. His duties included training and organization. His vision of the ‘standard’ organization was based on the idea that each unit should have only the minimum essential forces needed to conduct offensive operations in a fluid environment against relatively limited resistance.

For the infantry, this meant the three infantry regiments of the division, the four artillery battalions, the reconnaissance troop, and the engineer battalion developed between 1937-1941.

McNair’s real contribution was in streamlining the division structure. Special purpose units, particularly those whose mission was primarily defensive (e.g., AA and AT units) were ‘Pooled’ in non-divisional companies or battalions that higher headquarters could parcel out on an ‘as needed’ basis, specifically for employment in mass at critical points. The actual combat potential of a division, therefore, could change from day-to-day or mission-to-mission.

McNair went even further by encouraging the formation of ad hoc task forces for flexibility and the abolition of all non-divisional regiments. When not part of a division for a specific mission, armor, anti-aircraft, field artillery, mechanized cavalry, and combat engineer battalions reported to ‘group’ headquarters. The number of battalions in a group was irrelevant.

McNair also shrank the staff and support elements to reduce paperwork and organizational obstacles to deci. sion making and demanded that specialized units be equipped with the necessary weapons to perform as infantry or rear area security forces when needed.

His final contribution, and probably his most important, was to restrict the amount of motor transport in each unit as much as he could to facilitate ‘ strategic’ movement. Shipping space was at a premium and McNair wanted to get as much ‘Bang’ to Europe and the Pacific as possible for each shipping tonnage ‘Buck’. He sought to authorize only those trucks necessary to shuttle supplies to each regiment during a twenty-four hour lift rather than all at once.

Rifle units were not motorized! Each division, instead, contained six truck companies for leapfrogging them forward. He also encouraged infantry to ride supporting tanks or borrowed artillery trucks for short hops.

These concepts were only partially successful in combat. The divisions clambered for additional tank, AA, TD, and engineer support virtually all the time. Switching units between divisions often caused confusion and inefficiency. There were procedural and personality clashes between officers not used to each other’s way of doing things.

Once a good working relationship was established, prying effective support units away from a satisfied division commander was ‘difficult’. Higher headquarters tended to ‘let things be’ whenever possible to allow for mutual trust to develop.

A typical U.S. division in France in 1944 had attached tanks, TD’s, automatic AA weapons, corps engineer units, 4.2″ mortars, transportation, and logistical support units from corps and army levels. In the end, the triangular division was larger, more rigid, and more motorized than McNair envisioned.

These augmented divisions ended up with the mobility of a motorized division and often the firepower of an under strength armored division. Compare this to the German forces they faced and there is little doubt they presented a formidable opponent.

During the same period, the armored divisions underwent many more changes than the infantry divisions. When Jacob Devers; became chief of the Armored Force in August 1941 he broke up the rigid U.S. armored division organization in favor of two ‘Combat Commands’. The CCA and CCB headquarters could control any mixture of forces aimed at a particular mission. In this way the Americans institutionalized the Kampfgruppe concept the Germans achieved through improvisation.

Autore: John Fernandes

Fonte: The Citadel, Winter 2000